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Debate surrounding theories of decisions under risk and uncertainty has renewed interest in
the arguments of the utility function over event outcomes. The local measure of risk aversion
proposed by Arrow [1971] and Pratt [1964] for expected utility theory (EUT) is based on terminal
wealth being the argument. However, there is nothing in the axiomatic foundation of EUT that
requires one to use terminal wealth as the argument: Vickrey [1945] used income instead of terminal
wealth; von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944; p. 15-20][1953; p. 15-31] were agnostic; and Luce
and Raiffa [1957; ch.2] discussed alternatives such as scalar amounts of terminal wealth or income
or, alternatively, vectors of commodities. Arrow [1964], Debreu [1959; ch.7] and Hirshleifer [1965]
developed models in which the arguments of utility functions are vectors of contingent
commodities.
The choice of arguments of the utility function can have significant consequences for the
inferences one can plausibly draw from empirical estimates of risk attitudes. Many economics
experiments present participants with gambles over relatively small stakes and find that such
gambles are frequently turned down in favor of less risky gambles with smaller expected values:
modest risk aversion is the general finding. If the argument of the utility function is terminal wealth,
then some specific patterns of small stakes risk aversion have implausible implications for
preferences over gambles where the stakes are no longer small. One example from Rabin [2000] is
that the expected utility of terminal wealth model implies that an agent who turns down a 50/50 bet
of losing $100 or gaining $110, at all initial wealth levels between $100 and $300,000, will also turn
down a 50/50 bet with possible loss of $2,000 even when the gain is as large as $12 million if they
have an initial wealth of $290,000. However, if the argument of the utility function is not terminal
wealth, but rather the stakes offered in the gamble itself, or some other non-additive aggregation of
initial wealth and the stakes, implications of this assumed pattern of small stakes risk aversion are no
longer ridiculous (implausible) risk aversion (Cox and Sadiraj [2006]). 
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Given the importance of understanding the arguments of the utility function, the absence of
empirical tests is remarkable. We initially provide evidence that choices over small stakes bets in
Denmark are consistent with suppositions in the payoff calibration paradoxes. We then present
evidence from a unique data source that allows us to confront the question of whether integration of
wealth with income in risk preferences is full, partial or null, when agents are making choices over
gambles with more modest stakes. We combine field experimental data on lottery choices from a
sample of the Danish population and individual-level information on “personal wealth” from a
confidential database maintained by Statistics Denmark. Using these data we are able to identify a
measure of personal wealth for the very same individuals who participated in standard experimental tasks. This
allows us to explore theoretical specifications that measure the extent to which individuals integrate
their wealth with the prizes on offer in the experimental lottery tasks.
We find no support for the terminal wealth model. We consider the evidence pooling over
all subjects, assuming homogeneous preferences. Our subjects behave as if they integrate only a tiny
fraction of their personal wealth with the lottery prizes they are asked to make choices over. In
effect, this “weighted wealth” is indistinguishable statistically and economically from zero.
In section 1 we briefly review the theoretical literature on the arguments of utility over
vectors of outcomes and implications for the measurement of risk attitudes. We note that calibration
issues apply to a wide range of decision models. Moreover, extreme assumptions about the nature of
asset integration can be seen as special cases of a more flexible specification that admits both wealth
and experimental income as arguments of some non-linear function. These results are not new, but
they are not widely known. They are important because they serve up a menu of theoretically
coherent alternatives to the extreme, “all or nothing” assumptions about asset integration that are
often subsumed in the literature.
In section 2 we describe the data we have assembled from a combination of experimental
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tasks and links to Danish Registry databases maintained by Statistics Denmark (SD). The sense in
which our measure of “personal wealth” deserves quotation marks is explained. It does not include
everything that a theorist might want to see in there, such as the present subjective value of human
capital, nor does it include every category of financial wealth. On the other hand, it is arguably the
most comprehensive wealth measure available to those who are interested in testing the theories of
decision under risk.
In section 3 we present the structural model and econometric assumptions used to evaluate
the extent of asset integration inferred from our data, and implications for risk attitudes. Section 4
presents estimates and implications. Section 5 outlines some issues that arise in the general case in
which experimental choices and non-experimental choices are evaluated jointly. Section 6 draws
conclusions.
We make two contributions. The first is to develop a general framework that clarifies that
the core issue in the payoff calibration debate is the extent to which preferences are over income or
final wealth, and embeds the two extremes that have characterized the debate as special cases. The
second contribution is to use this framework to estimate the extent to which risk attitudes to income
variation in the lab are integrated with wealth using two sources of wealth variation. One source is a
within-subject manipulation of variations in wealth, and demonstrates that perfect asset integration
would indeed be consistent with payoff calibration puzzles for our sample. The second source is
cross-sectional variation of wealth in the Danish population, under the assumption of homogeneous
preferences, and implies very little asset integration. Experimental subjects’ choices under the first
source of wealth variation establishes the need for examination of the second source of wealth
variation.
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1. Theory
A. Calibration Critiques
Some seemingly plausible patterns of small-stakes risk aversion can be shown, through
concavity calibration arguments, to have implausible implications for large stakes gambles under the
terminal wealth specification, where initial wealth and income are integrated perfectly. Alternative
empirical identifications of small-stakes patterns have implausible large-stakes implications for
models defined on income, in which there is no integration of wealth with income. A different type
of (convexity) calibration analysis applies to models with nonlinear probability transformations. 
From this literature, the theories that are now known to be subject to calibration critique include
expected utility theory, dual theory, rank dependent utility (RDU) theory, cumulative prospect
theory, and weighted utility and betweenness theories. 
There are two types of calibration critiques that one needs to be cognizant of: we refer to
these as “payoff calibration” critiques and “probability calibration” critiques. We consider the
implications of the payoff calibration critiques. Within that category of critiques, the same risky (low-
stakes) lottery choices can have quite different implications depending on the extent to which wealth
is integrated with income in risk preferences. This is our principal focus, once we consider the
empirical validity of the “seemingly plausible patterns of risk aversion” that underpin the calibration
critique.
B. Small Stakes Risk Aversion
The payoff calibration critique may be stated in terms of four suppositions:
• P Ö “the agent is a risk averse EUT maximizer”
• Q Ö “the agent fully asset integrates”
• R Ö “the agent (weakly) turns down small-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a
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slightly lower expected value, and does so over a large enough range of wealth levels W”
• S Ö “the agent turns down large-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a
significantly lower value, and looks silly.”
The calibration puzzle is the claim that if P, Q and R are true, then S follows. Since the behavior
implied by supposition S is a priori implausible from a thought experiment, something must be
inconsistent with these suppositions. Rabin [2000] draws the implication that P must then be false,
and that one should employ models of decision-making under risk that relax supposition Q, such as
Cumulative Prospect Theory. As a purely logical matter, of course, this is just one way of many ways
to resolve this calibration puzzle.
Evidence claimed to support the premise in statement R that decision makers in experiments
exhibit small stakes risk aversion for a large enough finite interval of wealth levels comes from
designs in which subjects come to the experiment with potentially varying levels of wealth and each
makes a single decision about a small-stakes lottery (Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006]). This is
weak, indirect evidence, although it might be suggestive. Interpretation of these data as providing a
test of supposition R requires that we assume no variation of risk preferences between subjects and
full asset integration (FAI), and accept guesses rather than data about wealth levels.1 What is needed
to evaluate supposition R is an experimental design that varies the wealth of a given decision-maker,
who makes multiple decisions, and who can be presumed to behave consistently with one utility
function during the lab session. Cox and Sadiraj [2008] propose a simple experimental design that
does just this.
Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.33] propose that one give subjects choices between a safe lottery of
1 A common alternative assumption in the experimental literature is to assume no asset integration
and interpret variation across wealth and observed choices across subjects as heterogeneity of risk
preferences. It is apparent that both interpretations rest on previously untested, and extreme, assumptions
about the degree of asset integration (“full” or “none,” respectively).
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w for sure, and a risky lottery of a 50:50 chance of w-x or w+y, where w-x $ 0 and y > x. The key
idea is to vary w in the lab, and ask each subject to make lottery choice decisions at different levels of w.
Consider values of w from the ordered set, S = {w, w, w, w, w, w, w}, where smaller values of the
letter w denote smaller values of lab wealth. These values of lab wealth may be plausibly much less
than the W that the subject has in the field prior to the experiment. The experimenter does not need
to know W for a given subject, but by varying “lab wealth” from S for that subject the experimenter
has considered small-stakes lottery choices over 50-50 probabilities of a low prize of w-x and a high
prize of w+y against “lab wealth” w for sure, or “field + lab” wealth levels W+w, with w from S, for
that subject. This step of the design presumes that we vary lab wealth for a given subject, since then
we can plausibly presume that field wealth W is constant for that subject during the experimental
session. Integration of field wealth W with data from the experiment in analysis of calibration
paradoxes depends on existence of good data about field wealth and also assumes a version of
supposition Q for which the agent perfectly asset integrates field wealth and lab wealth.
If the agent prefers the safe lottery over the risky lottery for all of the lab wealth values used
in the experiment, then we have verification of supposition R, at least for the range of variation in
wealth proscribed by the experimenter’s budget. If we observe the agent choosing the safe lottery
for small levels of lab wealth but the risky lottery for larger levels of lab wealth, then supposition R is
rejected for that agent. Of course, we do not expect deterministic patterns of choice, so one ought
to make some claim about the statistical significance of these choice patterns. This is one of the
reasons for having multiple choices for each subject. An attractive feature of this experimental
design is that we need not structurally model the EUT decision process for the agent: we can rely on
simple statistical models such as (panel) probit, conditioned on lab wealth.
Building on this design, there have been “lab” tests of the premises of the calibration claims
by Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt and Dasgupta [2013] and Harrison, Lau, Ross and Swarthout [2017] that do
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not require integration of field wealth with lab wealth.
C. Partial Asset Integration within EUT
If supposition R cannot be rejected for the population under study, we must consider the
implications of the payoff calibration critique in a constructive manner, and for that we turn to the
idea of partial asset integration of wealth and income. We develop our analysis for a class of
expected utility models that includes as special cases models with full asset integration (FAI), models
with no asset integration (NAI), and models with partial asset integration (PAI). Models with full
asset integration are possibly subject to the payoff calibration critique of Hansson [1988] and Rabin
[2000]. Models with no asset integration or partial asset integration are possibly subject to the payoff
calibration critique of Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Rieger and Wang [2006]. Rather than engage in a
priori arguments or thought experiments about paradoxes of risky choice, we develop a general
theoretical model and let real data do some “real talking” in combination with that theoretical
structure.
Cox and Sadiraj [2006] discuss the expected utility of initial wealth and income model with
utility functional
I u(w, y) dG = EG (u(w, y)), (1)
where G is an integrable probability distribution function and u is a utility function of initial wealth
w and income y. We refer to this as the PAI-EUT model. Two standard models included in the PAI-
EUT model are the expected utility of terminal wealth model with full asset integration (FAI-EUT),
for which u(w, y) = ν(w+y), and the expected utility of income model with no asset integration
(NAI-EUT), for which u(w, y) = ξ(y).2 These two standard models are polar cases in the class of
2 Any utility function of the form u(w,y) = ξ(y) + h(w) would exhibit the same risk preferences over
income y as does ξ(y). 
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models of PAI.
In our application, we treat w as deterministic and known, and of course y is stochastic by
experimental design. This is consistent with the usual way in which asset integration is discussed in
the literature. We discuss this issue further in section 5.
We begin with a quasiconcave utility function u(w, y) defined over money payoff in the lab,
y, and a measure of wealth, w. In a typical experiment subjects’ payoffs are paid in amounts of cash
that may not be a perfect substitute for outside the laboratory wealth because of differences in
liquidity and transaction costs. For example, $100 in housing equity is not a perfect substitute for
$100 in cash received from participation in an experiment. Therefore, we consider the possibility
that money payoffs in an experiment and wealth outside the laboratory may not be perfect
substitutes.3 There is then a need to distinguish curvature of indifference curves due to preferences
over (w, y) from the preferences over risk.
D. Parametric Structure
A Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function can be used to aggregate wealth w and
3 It is the case that if w and y are allowed to be imperfect substitutes then we have to assume the
possibility of imperfect markets in w and y, or else some elementary no-arbitrage conditions would be
violated. We do not view this as particularly problematic, for three reasons. First, if behavior is better
characterized by assuming that w and y are indeed imperfect substitutes, then we have to assume imperfect
markets. But then that assumption is one that is in effect supported by the data, even if it runs counter to
some stylized model of behavior. That is, imagine that w and y are imperfect substitutes in preferences, but
perfect substitutes at some relative price in the market. Then we would never observe behavior suggesting
that they are perfect substitutes, hence we would never observe full asset integration behavior. The second
reason that we do not view the assumption of imperfect markets as problematic is that there are transactions
costs in converting one asset to another, at least for the assets we consider. These transactions costs might be
larger or smaller for different individuals, or for different asset classes when one considers generalizations (as
we do in §5), but those have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The third reason is related to the second:
we could imagine an even more general model in which the degree of asset integration emerges endogenously
as a function of circumstances: these could be the transactions costs faced in substituting assets in the market,
but it could also be the cognitive burden of thinking of the assets as perfect substitutes in preferences. That is,
for some unstated reason the agent might prefer to keep w and y in distinct “mental accounts,” but still think
of them as substitutable to some degree.
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money payoff y when there is no risk. The terminal wealth model is found at one extreme of
parameter values and the pure income model at the other. But the real interest is in between these
extremes, and the point is to let the behavior of our subjects tell us the extent to which they (behave
as if they) are integrating wealth with income from the experiment in making their choices. 
Assume that all agents have the same ordinal preferences (when there is no risk), but can
differ in their cardinal preferences (over risky outcomes).4 We begin with studying homothetic
preferences. Following Debreu [1976; p.122], there exists a least concave function, u*, which is a
cardinal utility that represents the same ordinal preferences. In case of homothetic preferences, the
least concave function is a homogenous function of degree one. So we use the CES specification 
v(w, y) = [ω w ρ + y ρ ] 1/ρ (2)
where w $ 0  is a measure of individual wealth, y $ 0 is the prize in the money payoff in the
experimental task, ω is a distributive share parameter to be estimated, σ = 1/(1-ρ) is the revealed
“elasticity of substitution” between wealth and experimental money payoff, and is also to be
estimated, and !4 < ρ#1 to ensure that v(.) is quasiconcave. Risk averse preferences over (w, y) are
represented by concave transformations of this function, and the EUT assumption that objective
probabilities are not modified to generate decision weights. An often used specification of such
transformation is the power function
U(v) = v1-r/(1-r) (3)
where r…1 and v is defined by (2). In effect, (2) and (3) define a two-level, nested utility function,
where (2) is an “aggregator function” defining a composite good, and (3) is the utility function
4 In a uni-variate model with either income or wealth as the only argument, cardinality is modeled
entirely through the concavity of the utility function over the single argument. Here, however, cardinality
depends also on the convexity of the contour functions over the two imperfectly substitutable utility
arguments.
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defined directly over that composite.5 Thus we can rewrite (3) more compactly as
U(w, y) = [(ω w ρ + y ρ ) (1-r)/ρ ]/(1-r) (3N)
where ω w ρ + y ρ > 0.6 This generalized CES function blends together full, partial, and null asset
integration on (w, y) space with risk preferences on composite good, v(w, y), space.
With these parametric assumptions, the familiar one-dimensional Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion with respect to y, evaluated at w, is then
[ r yρ -  wρ (ρ-1) ω ] / [ yρ + wρ ω ] (4)
We discuss the need for measures of multivariate risk aversion in section 5 if one is to generalize our
approach to allow both arguments of the utility function to be random.
Perfect asset integration with the “utility of terminal wealth” EUT model is the special case
in which ω > 0 and σ = 4. The usual case in the literature assumes further that ω=1, so that income
and wealth are added together on a 1:1 basis. Zero asset integration with the “utility of income”
EUT model, where income is interpreted tightly to mean the income from this specific experimental
choice,7 is the special case in which ω = 0.8  Note that we say nothing in this case about σ, because
5 This power function is unbounded, so it is useful to be clear on the implications for concavity
calibration puzzles under FAI and EUT on a bounded or unbounded domain. If the utility function is
bounded on (0, 4) then that is a sufficient condition for implausible risk aversion in large stakes (e.g., Cox and
Sadiraj [2008; Proposition 2, p.20]); global small-stakes risk aversion is not needed for this result. It is not a
necessary condition. Small-stakes risk aversion over all (0, 4) is a sufficient condition for the utility function to
be bounded (e.g., Rabin [2000; p.1283] or Cox and Sadiraj [2006; p.59, §C.4]); it is not, however, a necessary
condition. Being bounded on (0, 4) is a necessary condition for small-stakes risk aversion over the open
interval (0, 4), but it is not sufficient. An increasing power function is unbounded and hence violates the
necessary condition on boundedness; therefore it cannot represent risk attitudes that exhibit small-stakes risk
aversion over all (0, 4). The sufficiency part can be illustrated by considering a CARA function with
parameter 0.0003; it is bounded, however the small-stakes risk aversion pattern in Cox and Sadiraj [2006] is
not satisfied, since $100 for sure is rejected in favor of an equal chance of $210 or $0. Small-stakes risk aversion
defined on a finite interval implies nothing at all about the boundedness of the utility function. Finally,
small-stakes risk aversion over a large enough finite interval is a sufficient condition for implausible risk aversion
for large stakes, whether or not the utility function is bounded or unbounded.
6 For negative prizes in income, write it as:  ω w ρ + sign(y) abs(y) ρ > 0.
7 This interpretation is “tight” in the sense that one might also consider income from the set of
experimental tasks that this binary choice is embedded in, or the income from the whole experimental session.
For example, is income the lottery prize in one binary choice pair, the income from the 60 choices, or the
income from the whole session since there were additional paid choices in addition to these lottery choice
questions? One could undertake an exactly parallel discussion of partial asset integration within the
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any value of σ would generate the same observed choices if ω=0. Our main hypothesis is that
subjects perfectly asset integrate with their actual wealth.
2. Data
Our data consist of observations of choice behavior in experimental tasks and wealth data
for 442 individuals. The sample is representative of the adult Danish population residing in Greater
Copenhagen as of January 2015. Our sample consists of 52% men, aged 47 on average, 43% of
whom were married, with an average household size of 1.4, and with average income of 434,085
kroner per year. Comparing to the 1,455,772 comparable Danes in the Registry, our subjects are not
statistically significantly different except for household size and income: the population averages
were 1.54 and 338,859 kroner, respectively. 
All experiments were run in February and March, 2015. The experimental data are of the
standard type, and employ procedures described in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2014]. 
The wealth data are novel, and involve matching the experimental subjects with data
collected by SD. The matching process, and all statistical analyses with those data, occur “remotely”
at the statistical agency, to ensure privacy.
A. Experimental Data
Each of our 442 subjects was asked to make choices for each of 60 pairs of lotteries in the
gain domain, designed to provide evidence of risk aversion as well as the tendency to make decisions
experimental session, evaluating what might be called “local asset integration” issues. Our focus here is on
“global asset integration issues” between the usual interpretations of experimental data and the implications of
the calibration critiques.
8 And, to visualize these intuitively as perfectly complementary Leontief preferences, one might
further assume σ = 0. This assumption, although often implicit, is not necessary for NAI. 
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consistently with EUT or RDU models.9 An online appendix lists these lottery parameters, and the
logic behind them. In general each lottery has 3 prizes, although there are some lotteries with 4
prizes, 2 prizes or just 1 prize. The battery is based on ingenious designs from Wakker, Erev and
Weber [1994], Loomes and Sugden [1998] and Wilcox [2015], as well as the direct test of
supposition R proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.33] reviewed earlier. The analysis of risk
attitudes given these choices follows Harrison and Rutström [2008].
 There were 4 batteries used across the 442 subjects. Each battery included the 24 lottery
pairs from Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994]. One battery also included 36 lottery pairs from Wilcox
[2015], and this full set of 60 lottery pairs was administered to 222 subjects. The remaining three
batteries included the lotteries inspired by Loomes and Sugden [1998] and Cox and Sadiraj [2008],
for another set of 60 lottery pairs administered to 220 subjects; the three versions of this battery
differed by varying the scale of payoffs. 
We carefully selected these lotteries to ensure considerable variation in prizes and
probabilities, to facilitate identification of the full structural model. Over all batteries there are 90
distinct prizes and 16 distinct probabilities. At the individual subject level the number of distinct
prizes is either 37 or 26, and the number of distinct probabilities is either 16 or 12.
Apart from the tests of supposition R, these choices themselves are not the direct basis for
our evaluation of the payoff calibration paradoxes. Combined with the wealth data for each subject,
these choices allow us to estimate the risk preferences implied by EUT and RDU models, and those
estimates are then used to evaluate the paradoxes with counterfactual lottery choices. The many
variations in wealth, lottery payoffs and lottery probabilities implied by our design allow us to
9 The subjects were also presented with other decision tasks in the experiment, which are not
analyzed here. For each type of decision task the subjects had a 10% chance of getting paid. If they were paid
in the part of the experiment analyzed, one of the 60 decision tasks was randomly selected and the chosen
lottery was played out for payment. Average earnings for those who got paid from these 60 decision tasks was
1,923 DKK. Average earnings including recruitment fees across all 442 subjects was 954 DKK. 
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identify all the required theory parameters.
B. Wealth Data
Wealth data are based on register data from SD. Our data contain economic, financial, and
personal information on each individual from relevant official registers. The data set was constructed
based on two sources made available from SD and matched with our experimental data: these
sources are the Danish Civil Registration Office and the Danish Tax Authorities. All permanent
residents in Denmark, and all Danish citizens, have a unique social security number given at birth or
the date of formal residence, known as the CPR number, and this number allows us to match data
across data sources. The CPR number follows every individual throughout the entire life and all
information on an individual is registered on this number. We had access to the CPR number of
every subject in our experiments.
Individual and family data are taken from the records in the Danish Civil Registration. These
data contain the entire Danish population and provide unique identification across individuals and
households over time. Each record includes the personal identification number (CPR), name,
gender, date of birth, as well as the CPR numbers of nuclear family members (parents, siblings, and
children) and marital history (number of marriages, divorces, and widowhoods). In addition to
providing extra control variables, such as age, gender, and marital status, these data enable us to
identify the subjects who participated in the artefactual field experiment described above.
Income and wealth information are retrieved from the official tax records at the Danish Tax
Authorities (SKAT). This data set contains personal income and wealth information by CPR
numbers on the entire Danish population. SKAT receives this information directly from the relevant
sources: financial institutions supply information to SKAT on their customers’ deposits, on financial
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market assets, on interest paid or received, and on security investments and dividends. Employers
similarly supply statements of wages paid to their employees.
The wealth variable in our analysis is constructed from data reported by SD that represent net
individual wealth.10 Total assets are the market value of domestic real estate, shares and mutual
funds, bonds, assets deposited in domestic and foreign financial institutions, pensions and the value
of automobiles. Total liabilities are the value of debt in domestic and foreign financial institutions
and mortgages. All values of shares, bonds and pensions are reported by financial institutions as of
December 31, 2014; values of real estate are estimated by SD as the market value on December 31,
2014; and the value of automobiles is calculated by SD with a one-year lag.11 All values are in 2015
Danish kroner, and values are reported for the full sample of 442 subjects (conversions to USD use
the exchange rate 1 DKK . 6.643 USD applicable during most of the experiment).
Our wealth measure does not include cash, value of yachts, paintings, equity in privately held
companies, nor the market value of shareholder equity in privately held companies and unlisted mutual
funds. Our wealth measure does include shareholder equity in publically traded companies and listed
mutual funds. The wealth measure does not include non-traded assets such as human capital, which
means that borrowing for assets such as education is seen as debt without any corresponding assets.
This is arguably one of the most comprehensive measures of private financial wealth for an entire
population that one can get, although we realize that some important non-financial components are
left out.
Table 1 provides a tabulation of wealth and its components for our sample. The positive
10 An alternative is to use household wealth rather than individual wealth, exploiting further the ability
of our data to identify other members of the household of the subject in our experiments. On the other hand,
one then opens up subtle issues about whose risk attitudes were on display in the experiments (i.e., those of
the individual, or those of the household) and how households pool income from individuals.
11 All foreign assets and debt are self-reported to SKAT, and are zero for every subject in our sample. 
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skew of the distribution of wealth is no surprise. For 4.7% of our subjects, or 21 out of 442, there is
negative net wealth, reflecting the fact that some assets are not fully accounted for. For all
calculations we assume that wealth cannot be negative and truncate it to zero. Individuals with zero
field wealth having nothing to integrate with lab income: in a formal sense, of course, they do
integrate, but the effect is as if they do not since they have zero wealth.
Access to these unique data is an important issue, both in terms of the ability of others to
replicate our findings and for their ability to extend our analysis. Researchers at authorized Danish
institutions can gain access to de-identified micro data provided by SD through remote access
connections. SD manages most of Danish micro data. The fundamental authorization principle of
SD is that data will not be disclosed where there is an imminent risk that an individual person or
individual enterprise can be identified. This applies not only to identified data, such as CPR
numbers, but also to de-identified data, since such data are usually so detailed that identification can
be made. An online appendix documents procedures to access these data.
3. Econometric Model
A. Expected Utility Theory
Although the concerns about implausible risk attitudes under terminal wealth specifications
apply to all decision theories that are additive over states, we initially focus on EUT because it is
parsimonious. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome yj, p(yj), are those that are induced by
the experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in
each lottery i 0 {A, B}, where A and B denote left and right lottery, respectively. Using U(w, y) from
(3N), we then have:
EUi =3 j=1, J [ (p(y j )) × U(w, y j ) ] = 3 j=1, J [ p j × U(w, y j ) ] (6)
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for a lottery with J prizes. To capture behavioral errors we employ a Fechner specification with
“contextual utility,” so that we assume the latent index
LEU = [(EUB ! EUA)/τ]/μ (7)
where τ is a normalizing term described in a moment, μ is the Fechner behavioral error parameter to
be estimated, and EUB and EUA are the expected utilities of the right and left lottery as presented to
subjects. The normalizing term τ is defined as the difference between the maximum utility over all of
the prizes in that lottery pair minus the minimum utility over all of the prizes in that lottery pair.
Thus it varies from choice context to choice context, depends on the parameters of the utility
function, and normalizes the difference in EU to lie between 0 and 1. This results in a more
theoretically coherent concept of risk aversion when one allows for a behavioral error such as with μ
(Wilcox [2011]).
The latent index (7), based on latent preferences, is then linked to the observed experimental
choices using a standard cumulative normal distribution function Φ(LEU). This “probit” function
takes any argument between ±4 and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1 using this familiar
function. Thus we have the probit link function,
prob(choose lottery B) = Φ(LEU) (8)
The index defined by (7) is linked to the observed choices by assuming that the probability that the
B lottery is chosen depends on LEU in the manner specified by (8).
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and utility
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of the utility function given the above statistical
specification and the observed choices. The log-likelihood for the utility function (3N) is
ln L(r, ω, ρ, μ; c, w) = 3i [ (ln Φ(LEU)×I(ci = 1)) + (ln Φ(1!LEU)×I(ci = !1)) ] (9)
where I(@) is the indicator function, ci =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option B (A) lottery in risk
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aversion task i, and LEU is defined using the parameters r, ω, ρ and μ.12 All estimates employ
clustering at the level of the individual, since errors for a given individual may be correlated.
B. Rank Dependent Utility Theory
One popular alternative to EUT is to allow the decision-maker to transform the objective
probabilities presented in lotteries and to use these weighted probabilities as decision weights when
evaluating lotteries. To calculate decision weights under RDU one replaces expected utility defined
by (6) with RDU
RDUi = 3 j=1,J [ (d(y j )) × U(w, y j ) ] = 3 j=1,J [ d j × U(w, y j ) ] (10)
where
dj = π(pj + ... + pJ) - π(pj+1 + ... + pJ) (11a)
for j=1,... , J-1, and
dj = π(pj) (11b)
for j=J, with the subscript j ranking outcomes from worst to best, π(@) is some probability weighting
function, dj is the decision weight on the jth-ranked outcome, and RDU refers to the Rank-
Dependent Utility model. Of course, one then has to specify the functional form for π(p) and
estimate additional parameters, but the logic extends naturally.
We use the general functional form proposed by Prelec [1998] for probability, since it
exhibits considerable flexibility. This function is
π(p) = exp{-η(-ln p)φ}, (12)
12 One of the core hypotheses to be tested is that ω = 0, and one can run into issues with such
hypothesis tests where the parameter in question is close to the boundary of an admissible region. In fact, we
are estimating a likelihood function that is already highly non-linear in the parameters (e.g., the curvature of
the utility function). Hence we can use a standard numerical method to constrain parameters such as ω to lie
in the unit interval by estimating a different parameter o which is then, in the function evaluator, converted
to ω = 1/(1+exp(o)).  In this manner the algorithm evaluating the likelihood can vary o between ±4 and still
keep ω constrained to the unit interval. All hypothesis tests defined over ω are numerically undertaken on the
estimated parameter o, which by definition never gets close to a boundary (the hypothesis tests are therefore
non-linear in nature, and use the “delta method” to correctly infer test statistics and p-values).
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and is defined for 0<p#1, η>0 and φ>0; note that we do not require 0<φ<1. When φ=1 this
function collapses to the familiar Power function π(p) = pη, and EUT assumes the identity function
π(p)=p, which is the case when η = φ = 1. With (12) included, the log-likelihood then becomes
ln L(r, ω, ρ, η, φ, μ; c, w) = 3i [ (ln Φ(LRDU)×I(ci = 1)) + (ln Φ(1!LRDU)×I(ci = !1)) ] (13)
and we estimate the model with two extra parameters for the probability weighting function.
Estimating the RDU model from experiments that employ the Random Lottery Incentive
Method (RLIM) requires that one assumes that individuals isolate each pairwise lottery choice within
the series from each other. This implies the compound independence axiom, even though the RDU
model allows independence to be violated when subjects evaluate each simple lottery. The vast
majority of incentivized lottery choice experiments use RLIM and rely on this axiom. Thus, the
RDU model applied to RLIM data inconsistently relaxes that axiom when it comes to evaluating
individual lotteries, but assumes that it is valid when applying the RLIM payment protocol (Harrison
and Swarthout [2014] and Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt [2015]).
4. Results and Implications
A. Tests of the Small Stakes Risk Aversion Premis
Using the test proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008] for a sub-sample of 220 adult Danes from
our complete sample of 442, we actually find evidence of the relevant type of “small stakes risk
aversion” for the range of lab wealth we considered. The experimental design involved them each
making 6 binary choices in the wider battery of binary choices we consider below. Subjects were
randomized to 6 lottery choice pairs from a set of 18 possible pairs, spanning 17 different levels of
lab wealth. Hence the lab wealth varied for each subject over their 6 choices, and we have pooled
data spanning the 17 lab wealth levels. The gains and losses in absolute value were paired for each
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subject over different lab wealth levels: for example, +180 and -160 for lab wealth levels of 300
(.$45) and 2700 (.$406). Although we refer to “lab wealth,” all that the subject saw was a lottery
that had one outcome with a probability of 1, and another lottery with the usual risky outcomes.13
Hence we did not use language or framing that would lead subjects to be more or less inclined to
integrate it into their extra-lab, “field wealth.” Nor were the outcomes in the risky lottery presented
as deviations from the certain outcome of the non-risky lottery, which might also encourage
framing. For example, subjects were asked to choose between 2,700 kroner for sure and the risky
lottery with outcomes 2,540 kroner and 2,880 kroner. With perfect asset integration, 2,540 kroner
adds to the subject’s wealth no matter what the subject’s choice is, so we refer to 2,540 kroner as
“lab wealth.”
Figure 1 shows the findings with a random effects panel probit model, since there is no need
here for structural estimation of risk preferences. We find no significant evidence of a decline in risk
aversion for lab wealth levels over the range considered here. The solid line shows the average
prediction, and the shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval around that prediction. Subjects
exhibit risk aversion for all levels of lab wealth considered here. So we conclude that the evidence
for these adult Danes and these levels of lab wealth does not lead us to reject supposition R, that “the
agent turns down small-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a slightly lower expected
value, and does so over a large enough range of wealth levels W.”
Since supposition R, one of the premises of the calibration critique, is not rejected, there is a
need to examine the partial asset integration specification proposed earlier.
13 An alternative way to add a lab wealth component might be to randomly add it to the show-up fee
for participating in the experiment. The problem with this approach is that it would raise a potential confound
due to sample selection issues.
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B. Basic Results on Asset Integration for Representative Agents
We now employ the full sample of 442 Danes, and all of the 60 binary choices each of them
made. Panel A of Table 2 shows maximum likelihood estimates of the utility function (3N). We
assume here that every adult Dane in our sample has the same ordinal preferences over w and y
(when there is no risk), as well as the same coefficient r; an online appendix considers estimates for
each individual. The coefficient r is estimated precisely, as is the parameter ω reflecting the weight
attached to wealth. We find that the weight attached to wealth is virtually zero, and statistically not
different from zero. This is a fundamental result, since it means that the PAI specification collapses
to the NAI specification in this pooled estimation, and we reject the FAI hypothesis. It also means
that it is virtually impossible, for sensible economic reasons, to identify the substitutability between
w and y. We find an estimate of ρ of 0.89, implying an estimate of σ of 9.1, but since there is
virtually no weighted wealth to substitute with, these values have little economic meaning.
Average net wealth in the estimation sample is 3,074,678 kroner (.$462,845), so these
estimates imply that individuals behave as if they evaluate experimental income relative to a weighted
baseline wealth of ω×w = 3074678 × 0.00000625 = 19 kroner (.$2.86). This is effectively zero in
economic terms: for example, it would currently only get half of an Egg McMuffin Value Meal in a
Danish McDonalds. Another way to evaluate this weighted baseline wealth estimate of 19 kroner is by
comparison with the lottery prizes, which ranged between 0 kroner and 6,750 kroner (.$1,016).
Needless to say, we can easily reject the hypothesis of FAI since ω . 0, and the p-value on the test of
the hypothesis that ω = 0 is 0.77.
Another way to see these results, perhaps more intuitively, is to see if measures of Net
Wealth correlate with risk attitudes in a reduced form manner. We do this by estimating the EUT-
NAI model and asking if the coefficient r is significantly affected by Net Wealth: in this case we
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model r as a linear function of some covariates. Our structural results suggest that they should not,
since Net Wealth is “zeroed” out by a very low estimate of ω, at least when we assume homogeneous risk
preferences. If we include Net Wealth the effect on r is -0.004 with a p-value of 0.45; if we include a
dummy for the top quartile of Net Wealth the effect on r is +0.004 with a p-value of 0.93; if we
include the 5 major components of Net Wealth we have a joint effect that has a p-value of 0.45, and
no component has an individual effect with a p-value below 0.23. On the other hand, when we
include the components of Net Wealth and some basic demographics (gender, age, marital status,
household size, and net income) we do find a significant joint effect of the components of Net
Wealth with a p-value of 0.005, and the individual component net deposits (with financial
institutions) has a significant individual effect of -0.07 with a p-value of 0.003. These results point to
the importance of controlling for heterogeneity, and we do that in an online appendix by estimating
the model for each individual, thereby allowing implicitly for all observable and unobservable individual
characteristics.
C. Payoff Calibration Implications for EUT
Using these estimates and the average value of wealth in Denmark we can evaluate the
Certainty Equivalents (CE) of a range of lotteries varying in the scale of the stakes. Implausible
implications for large stakes can be detected through an extremely low ratio of CE to the Expected
Value (EV).14
Panel B of Table 2 shows implied CE values using the CRRA utility function (3N) and the
parameter estimates in Panel A. Let H denote a high prize and L denote a low prize, for H>L. The
CE in Table 2 is then the sure amount of money that has the same expected utility to the individual
14 Similar results are obtained with median wealth instead of average wealth. The ratio of EV to CE is
slightly lower, but close to those reported here.
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as the lottery that pays H with probability p and L with probability (1-p). The CE is defined by
U(w, CE) = p × U(w, H) + (1-p) × U(w, L). (14)
So this CE solves for risky income in the experiment, and the stakes are chosen to be within the
payoff domain in our experiments. The smallest ratio of CE to EV is 0.362, and most are much
higher: these ratios are hardly implausible in the sense of the term used by Hansson [1988], Rabin
[2000], Neilson [2001], Rieger and Wang [2006], Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Safra and Segal [2008]. 
Figure 2 evaluates the traditional Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (RRA) in (4)
for the estimated EUT-PAI model. The wealth levels in each panel range up to 5 million kroner.
Panel A displays RRA for low stakes lottery prizes up to 10,000 kroner, and Panel B displays RRA
for high stakes lottery prizes up to 1 million kroner. Both Panel A and Panel B shows modest levels
of risk aversion for a wide range of wealth and experimental payoffs.
These PAI estimates allow us to verify that (a) getting 190 with probability ½ and 0 with
probability ½ is rejected in favor of getting 75 for sure, for all wealth amounts smaller than 35
million; and (b) the same utility function exhibits plausible risk aversion for large stakes. Under FAI,
no EUT-consistent agent can exhibit both (a) and (b).
It is, however, possible to come up with some “edge cases” in which the predictions of
EUT-PAI are implausible. For example, at a wealth level of 307 kroner, a low prize of 0, and a high
prize of 5,000 kroner, we get very low ratios of CE to EV, between 0.0004 and 0.12, for
probabilities between 0.01 and 0.3 on the large prize. As the wealth level increases to the mean
wealth level of 3,074,678 kroner, the same example generates low ratios between 0.02 and 0.12 for
probabilities between 0.01 and 0.2 on the high prize. We return to compare results for these special
cases when we allow for RDU risk preferences.
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D. Probability Weighting
The RDU model estimates with the PAI specification are shown in Panel A of Table 3, and
show evidence of slight probability weighting pessimism. Compared to the EUT estimates for the
PAI specification, there is less curvature on the utility of outcomes once the possibility of probability
pessimism is allowed for.15 We can easily reject the assumption that there is no probability weighting
(η = φ=1), and this is reflected in the improved log-likelihood with the RDU model over EUT. In
terms of PAI, the estimates are similar to those under EUT except that there is slightly more
substitutability between wealth and lab payoffs: in particular, the fundamental finding that ω . 0 is
the same.
The overall log-likelihood of the RDU-PAI model is the best of the RDU specifications
considered (RDU-NAI, RDU-PAI and RDU-FAI). We can formally reject the FAI hypotheses since
ω is estimated precisely, ω . 0, and we cannot formally reject the null hypothesis that ω = 0 at any
conventional statistical level. For the same reasons, we cannot reject the NAI hypothesis either.
For reasons already noted for the EUT-PAI model, when ω 6 0 the economic meaning of
the parameters defining the substitutability if w and y disappears. We formally estimate ρ to be
0.9999927, with a standard error that spans 1, so it is no surprise that the estimate of σ = 1/(1-ρ) is
extremely high, at 137,913, and with a large standard error. Again, these wild numerical values follow
directly from the economics of the CES function (2) when ω 6 0, and have no substantive
significance or effect on the other parameter estimates (i.e., one could just as easily have constrained
ρ = 1 and inferred essentially the same estimates).
15 In other words, for the same choice data, the EUT and RDU models decompose the same risk
premium in a different way. The EUT model ascribes all of the risk premium to UO<0, and the RDU model
explains the risk premium with UO<0 as well as probability pessimism. Since probability pessimism, ceteris
paribus UO, generates a risk premium itself, the net effect must be for there to be less diminishing marginal
utility under RDU than there is under EUT.
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E. Payoff Calibration Implications for RDU
Using the RDU-PAI estimates from Table 3, we can again evaluate the ratio of the CE to the
EV for a range of low stakes and high stakes lotteries. Using the same lotteries as in Panel B of
Table 2, in Panel B of Table 3 the CE now solves
U(w, CE) = h(p) × U(w, H) + (1-h(p)) × U(w, L). (15)
The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table 3 is 0.478, and most are much higher, exactly as in Table 2.
In general the ratios in Tables 2 and 3 are similar. It is easy to verify that the RDU-PAI model also
satisfies the payoff calibration conditions noted earlier for the EUT-PAI model.
Again, as with the EUT-PAI estimates, using these RDU-PAI estimates one can verify that
(a) getting 190 with probability ½ and 0 with probability ½ is rejected in favor of getting 75 for sure,
for all wealth amounts smaller than 15.8 million; and (b) the same utility function exhibits plausible
risk aversion for large stakes. Under FAI, no RDU-consistent agent can exhibit both (a) and (b).16
Using these RDU estimates, we can reconsider the edge cases noted earlier, under EUT-PAI,
in which the PAI predictions are implausible. Under EUT-PAI, at the low wealth level of 307, the
ratio of CE to EV was between 0.0004 and 0.12 for probabilities between 0.01 and 0.3 on the large
prize: with RDU-PAI these ratios are between 0.04 and 0.27, which range from implausible to
plausible. The ratio is 0.09, 0.13 and 0.20 for probabilities on the large prize of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2,
respectively. As the wealth level increases to the mean wealth level of 3,074,678 kroner, the same
16 Although these exercises showing how a representative agent would react to various risky contexts
are informative about average behavior, they do not allow for heterogeneity in preferences. In fact, the
estimate of ω may, in part, reflect heterogeneity in risk attitudes that just happens to be correlated with wealth,
rather than some true relation between risk attitudes and wealth. Under CRRA, for any given value of r, a
higher wealth level would predict more risk taking choices in the lottery tasks. Without having observations
where wealth varies at the individual subject level, this possibility cannot be ruled out. Thus, if the true
preferences are NAI, a positive ω could just be reflecting the possibility that, in our sample, the subjects with
higher wealth are less risk averse. Or, if the true preferences are FAI, ω < 1 could just be reflecting the
possibility that, in our sample, the subjects with higher wealth are more risk averse.
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example generates plausible ratios under RDU-PAI between 0.26 and 0.31 for probabilities between
0.01 and 0.2 on the high prize.
These edge cases show that although the PAI model can accommodate risk version at small
and large stakes at the same time, there remain cases falsifying the model. These edge cases allow us
to identify the limits of the PAI approach as it is specified here. However, considering a more
flexible specification of ω, where it varies with context, could accommodate these edge cases. When
RDU-PAI fails to work in these edge cases, so does RDU-NAI. However, the RDU-PAI prediction
becomes plausible at wealth levels that are large enough to make baseline wealth ω×w meaningful
for predictions with stochastic income.  In contrast, the performance of RDU-NAI cannot improve
with increasing wealth levels.  This also applies to Cumulative Prospect Theory, which is equivalent
to RDU-NAI when all choices are made on the gain domain. With the exception of the edge cases,
the PAI model does well, as illustrated by the examples in Tables 2 and 3. It does particularly well
when paired with the RDU model of decision-making under risk.
5. Generalizations
As flexible as our approach is in comparison to the full integration and no integration special
cases that have dominated the discussion, it is still something of a “reduced form” approach to the 
structural question of the joint determination of lab and non-lab choices. In effect, we take the
myriad of decisions underlying w to be given, implicitly assuming that all components of w are
symmetric in their relation to y. Given the importance of the issue, we sketch several deeper issues
that must be addressed as one generalizes our approach.
In general, it need not be the case that there is symmetry with respect to components of w and
experimental choices over y. This is immediately problematic when one considers experimental
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interventions in the field that offer choices over vectors of commodities rather than just money. For
example, the experimental provision of a subsidized microinsurance product over one type of
stochastic outcome, such as the weather, might be expected to interact with cropping choices
differently than family planning decisions or retirement decisions. Closer to our setting, some
components of w, such as more liquid components of wealth, might be viewed as closer substitutes
to experimental income than others.17 These extensions can be immediately captured with nested-
CES aggregator functions, of the kind that are common in demand analysis and computable general
equilibrium modeling.18
In a related vein, individual wealth might be viewed as a closer substitute to experimental
income that the individual is choosing over, and other household wealth as not perfectly fungible with
individual wealth. Or we might consider an intertemporal utility function defined over stochastic
prizes to be paid today and stochastic prizes to be paid in the future (Kihlstrom [2009] and
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2016]).19 In essence, wealth held as financial assets are
simply claims on future income in this manner, thus motivating interest in such intertemporal utility
functions.
17 We can consider those subjects who have more than the median fraction of Net Wealth in
relatively liquid form, which in our case refers to net assets in financial institutions, bonds, and shares. For
simplicity of interpretation, we focus just on point estimates for individual subjects, without conditioning on
the statistical significance of the estimate. Around 77% of these subjects are RDU-consistent. Just over 92%
of these subjects have an ω less than 0.05, and 85% have an ω less than 0.001; 79%, 83% and 90%,
respectively, have a weighted baseline wealth ω × w less than 10 kroner, 1,000 kroner, and 100,000 kroner,
respectively. Just over 86% of these subjects have a coefficient of relative risk aversion for the composite, r,
greater than 0 and less than 0.5. Hence we conclude that these subjects are actually closer to NAI than the
typical subject. 
18 The nested-CES class allows global regularity and local flexibility in the specification proposed by
Perroni and Rutherford [1995]. Many specifications that allow local flexibility trade off global regularity, an
important property for calibration critiques.
19 One might argue that some of these examples of imperfect substitutes derive from the absence of
perfect capital markets. For example, in the intertemporal case the existence of perfect capital markets implies
the familiar Fisherian (non-)separation theorem. In these cases one would simply restate results in terms of
indirect utility functions.
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Once we consider multiple arguments of the utility function there are a number of
theoretical subtleties to consider. One issue is to consider multivariate measures of risk aversion.
Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] proposed such an approach under the restrictive assumption that the
ordinal preferences underlying two expected utility functions exhibit the same preferences over non-
stochastic outcomes. In this case they propose a scalar measure of total risk aversion that allows one
to make statements about whether one person is more risk averse than another in several
dimensions, or if the same person is more risk averse after some event than before.
If one relaxes this assumption, which is not an attractive one, Duncan [1977] shows that the
Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] multivariate measure of risk aversion naturally becomes matrix-
valued. Hence one has vector-valued risk premia, and this vector is not “direction dependent” in
terms of evaluation. Karni [1979] shows that one can define the risk premia in terms of the
expenditure function, rather than the direct utility function, and then evaluate it “uniquely” by
further specifying some statistic of the stochastic process. For example, if one is considering risk
attitudes towards a vector of stochastic price shocks, then one could use the mean of those shocks.
A closely related literature defines multi-attribute risk aversion where the utility function is
defined over more than one attribute. In our case one attribute would be experimental payoffs y and
the other attribute would be extra-experimental wealth w. In this context, Keeney [1973] first
defined the concept of conditional risk aversion, Richard [1975] defined the same concept as
bivariate risk aversion, and Epstein and Tanny [1980] defined it as correlation aversion. There are
several ways to extend these pairwise concepts of risk aversion over two attributes to more than two
attributes, as reviewed by Dorfleitner and Krapp [2007].
One attraction of the concept of multiattribute risk aversion is that it allows a relatively
simple characterization of the functional forms for utility that rule out multiattribute risk attitudes:
-27-
additivity. One can have an additive multiattribute utility function and still exhibit partial, or single-
attribute, risk aversion. Similarly, one can generate results that do not depend on partial, single-
attribute risk aversion, but could still depend on multiattribute risk aversion.20
A simple, but important, application of the concept of multiattribute aversion, referred to
above as correlation aversion, is when considering intertemporal utility functions. In this case
allowing for a non-additive intertemporal utility function allows one to tease apart “a-temporal risk
preferences” from “time preferences,” especially temporally correlated risk preferences. In this
application one attribute is the amount of money involved (more or less) and the other attribute is
when it is paid (sooner or later). This approach can be directly implemented in controlled
experiments, as illustrated by Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2016]. For present purposes, it
can be viewed as another application of the idea of bivariate risk aversion, which is the same idea as
our concept of partial asset integration over a-temporal w and y.
A second broad set of issues is the characterization of behavior when portfolio choices are
disaggregated, and when they are integrated with consumption and leisure choices. Within the field
of insurance economics, Mayers and Smith [1983] and Doherty [1984] have stressed the
confounding effect that allowing for non-traded assets can have on the demand for insurance. For
example, if risks in one domain are perfectly correlated with risks in another domain, but traded
insurance is only available in one domain, the rational risk-averse agent would tend to “over-insure.”
A large part of the theory of risk management derives from the complementarity and substitutability
of “self protection” and “self insurance” activities with formal insurance purchases identified by
Ehrlich and Becker [1972]. The joint modeling of consumption behavior, leisure demand and
20 For multivariate risk aversion, the Hessian should be negative semidefinite under the Kihlstrom
and Mirman [1974] definition. For positive r, our utility function (3N) is a composition of  increasing, concave
functions, hence its Hessian is negative semidefinite. Applying the matrix-valued measures of Duncan [1977]
and Karni [1979] would be more involved, of course.
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portfolio choices begun, with non-additive utility functions, by Cox [1975] and Ingersoll [1992],
identifies numerous avenues for testable propositions about the unexpected spillover effects of
policy interventions. There is also a large literature on the effects of consumption “commitments”
on behavior towards risk, starting with Grossman and Laroque [1990] and applied directly to the
issue of risk calibration by Chetty and Szeidl [2007]. Finally, the partial asset integration approach
could provide a rigorous bridge to characterizing the manner in which decision makers employ
“mental accounts” to structure the tradeoffs between components of w and y, in the spirit of Thaler
[1985] and Thaler and Johnson [1990].21 The hypothesis of mental accounts involves testable
statements about the nested nature of substitutability between different components of w and/or y,
and the possibility that ω is context dependent. Once we consider a wider range of stakes, both for
income and wealth, there are many ways of characterizing the relationship between risk attitudes
over these utility arguments. Such specifications are discussed in the broader literature on
multivariate and multi-attribute risk aversion.
A third set of broad issues has to do with the treatment of wealth as being deterministic and
21 Thaler and Johnson [1990] focused directly on the question of how risk-taking behavior is affected
by prior gains or losses, and do not directly consider integration with wealth. But the issues they examine with
respect to the “components of y” have direct application to the generalization we propose. They view choices
from the perspective of Prospect Theory (PT), but allow for interesting variations in the manner in which the
“editing phase” of PT is applied. They provide (p.646) a simple example in which the subject is told that they
have just won $30, and must then choose between (a) no further gain or loss, or (b) a 50-50 chance of
winning $9 or losing $9. Three representations of this problem are suggested: (a) u($21) + w(½) [ u($39) -
u($21) ]; (b) u($30) + w(½) u($9) + w(½) u(-$9); and (c) u($21) + w(½) u($18). The representation in (a)
assumes that prior outcomes are embedded into the choice problem. In effect, it adds “memory” to the
standard PT representation of the task, and then applies the PT editing rule that the prospect is broken into
the certain part and then the residual uncertain part (Kahneman and Tversky [1979; p.276]). The
representation in (b) assumes that prior outcomes, in this case the $30 of cumulative income, has no effect on
the framing of the task. This is the standard PT formulation. The difference between (a) and (b) has
something of the flavor of the asset integration parameter ω that we introduced. But it also has something of
the flavor of an endogenous reference point for PT. The representation in (c) assumes that subjects actively
deform the prospect to make it appear more attractive. Thus the possibility of a $9 loss is integrated into the
$30 on hand, to be evaluated as a certain $21, and the risky part of the gamble is evaluated as a potential gain
of $18. 
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known, while experimental income is stochastic by experimental design. Although consistent with
the manner in which asset integration is discussed in the literature, our PAI approach formally allows
for there to be a joint probability distribution over wealth and experimental income. An important
extension would be to elicit subjective beliefs from individuals about the value of their net wealth at
the time of the experiment (or as of some very recent date). After all, who knows with certainty the
current value of their net wealth?  Since the correlation between subjective beliefs about own-wealth
and experimental income is zero, again by design, one can just elicit beliefs about wealth (Harrison,
Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2017]) and then construct the joint distribution as a mixture
of subjective beliefs about own-wealth and objective probabilities in the experimental lotteries.
This extension connects our approach to the logic of Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006],
who emphasize the role of risks from gambles such as one confronts in an experiment being merged
with pre-existing risks from extra-experimental income or wealth. If the risks in the experimental
lottery are independent of these pre-existing risks, the diversification benefits of the combination
might offset any first-order risk aversion towards the experimental lottery evaluated in isolation.
Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006] then posit that the individual evaluates small-stakes gambles in
isolation, and is driven to exhibit first-order risk aversion, but that the same agent evaluates large-
stakes gambles as part of this broader portfolio, tempering the small-stakes risk aversion. Our
approach does not require this state-dependent utility specification to account for small-stakes risks
and large-stakes risks, although we certainly agree that the riskiness of wealth and experimental
income ought to be considered jointly in a complete treatment. 
This extension also connects our approach to the logic of Kőszegi and Rabin [2007], who
consider the implications of loss aversion relative to a stochastic reference point, defined in terms of
subjective beliefs about outcomes of the lottery. Recognizing that “... relatively little evidence on the
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determinants of reference points currently exists,” (p. 1051), they make this notion operational by
assuming that individuals use the EV of the lottery as their subjective belief about the lottery
outcome. Our approach immediately extends to include this specification, since we formally allow a
joint probability distribution over wealth and experimental income.
The theme of these comments is that our approach is much more general than the resolution
of a puzzle about the calibration of choices over risky y in the lab when one takes into account extra
lab w. In effect, the rigorous evaluation of seemingly arcane calibration puzzles via models of partial
asset integration opens up many areas for research that have tended to be neglected in the
calibration debate.
6. Conclusions
The experimental behavior of adult Danes that have any personal wealth is consistent with
partial asset integration, in the dual sense that they behave as if some fraction of personal wealth is
combined with experimental prizes in a utility function, and that the combination entails less than
perfect substitution. Of course, those who have no wealth cannot, as a matter of definition, integrate
it with experimental income. Overall, we conclude that our subjects do not perfectly asset integrate.
The implied risk attitudes from estimating these partial asset integration specifications imply
risk premia and certainty equivalents under EUT that are a priori plausible when confronted with the
payoff calibration paradox. Hence our EUT-PAI specification is promising, by surviving the payoff
calibration paradox.
Extending the analysis to an RDU model, we find evidence of modest probability weighting
and diminishing marginal utility under partial asset integration. Only when one insists a priori, and
contrary to the inferences we draw about behavior, that decisions are best characterized with full
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asset integration does probability weighting come to dominate the characterization of risk attitudes
over experimental payoffs. Nonetheless, the RDU-PAI specification also seem to survive the payoff
calibration paradox.
These are constructive solutions to the payoff calibration paradoxes. In addition, the
rigorous, structural modeling of partial asset integration points to a rich array of neglected questions
in risk management and policy evaluation in important field settings.
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Table 1: Individual Wealth in Denmark
All currency values in Danish Kroner (1 DKK . $6.643 in September 2015).
All valuations as of December 31, 2014, except for Automobiles, which has a 1 year lag.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.
Total assets 3,844,104 2,985,522 4,521,335
    Real estate 1,427,395 1,000,828 2,734,828
    Shares and mutual funds 185,023 2,859 562,243
    Bonds 4,006 0 28,118
    Assets in financial institutions 186,747 65,762 311,192
    Pensions 1,969,176 1,162,490 2,504,648
    Automobiles 71,758 27,400 105,166
Total liabilities 769,426 352,192 2,212,928
    Debt in financial institutions 190,558 26,133 439,769
    Mortgages 578,869 0 2,023,922 
Net wealth 3,074,678 2,165,847 3,470,853
Net wealth truncated at zero 3,097,435 2,165,847 3,439,401
Note: Total assets are the market value of domestic real estate, shares and mutual funds, bonds, assets deposited in
domestic and foreign financial institutions, pensions and the value of automobiles. Total liabilities are the value
of debt in domestic and foreign financial institutions and mortgages. All values of shares, bonds and pensions
are reported by financial institutions as of December 31st. Values of real estate are estimated by Statistics
Denmark as the market value on December 31st. The value of automobiles is calculated with a one-year lag. All
foreign assets and debt are self reported and equal to 0 for every subject in the sample. All values are in 2015
Danish kroner, and values are reported for the full sample of 442 subjects.
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Table 2: Estimates and Implied Certainty-Equivalents Using EUT-PAI Model
A. Estimates
Sample of 442 individuals making 26,520 choices of strict preference
Log-Likelihood = -17,025 (-17,028 for NAI and -17,436 for FAI)
Null hypothesis for p-value results is that the coefficient estimates is 0.
 
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
r 0.64 0.04 <0.001 0.57 0.71
ρ 0.89 0.15 <0.001 0.6 1.19
ω 0.000006 0.00002 0.77 -0.00004 0.00005
μ 0.08 0.005 <0.001 0.07 0.09
B. Certainty-Equivalent Calculations with Average Wealth
High Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of High Prize
Low Prize
(DKK)
Expected
Value (DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
200 0.5 100 150 145 0.965
500 0.5 100 300 252 0.84
1000 0.5 100 550 402 0.73
2000 0.5 100 1,050 663 0.631
5000 0.5 100 2,550 1,350 0.529
5000 0.01 100 149 109 0.732
5000 0.1 100 590 214 0.362
5000 0.3 100 1,570 626 0.399
5000 0.7 100 3,530 2,459 0.697
5000 0.9 100 4,510 4,025 0.892
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Table 3: Estimates Using RDU-PAI Model
A. Estimates
Sample of 442 individuals making 26,520 choices of strict preference
Log-Likelihood = -16,973 (-16,976 for NAI and -17,049 for FAI) 
Null hypothesis for p-value results is that the coefficient estimates is 0.
Parameter
Point
Estimate
Standard
Error p-value 95% Confidence Interval
r 0.48 0.05 <0.001 0.38 0.57
η 1.12 0.04 <0.001 1.04 1.2
φ 0.84 0.02 <0.001 0.8 0.88
ω 0.0000106 0.00001 0.46 -0.00002 0.00001
ρ 1 0.00003 <0.001 0.999 1
μ 0.1 0.005 <0.001 0.09 0.11
B. Certainty-Equivalent Calculations with Average Wealth
Large Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of Large Prize
Small Prize
(DKK)
Expected
Value (DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
200 0.5 100 150 141 0.937
500 0.5 100 300 244 0.813
1,000 0.5 100 550 395 0.717
2,000 0.5 100 1,050 668 0.636
5,000 0.5 100 2,550 1,418 0.556
5,000 0.01 100 149 126 0.848
5,000 0.1 100 590 290 0.492
5,000 0.3 100 1,570 751 0.478
5,000 0.7 100 3,530 2,371 0.672
5,000 0.9 100 4,510 3,800 0.842
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Appendix A: Experimental Lottery Parameters
The variable “qid” is the label used to identify the specific lottery pair. The initial stem of the
qid defines the type of lottery, as explained in the text:
1. The Loomes and Sugden [1998] lotteries are defined by the text “ls”;
2. The Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994] lotteries are defined by the text “rWEW”; 
3. The calibration premise lotteries, from the logic of Cox and Sadiraj [2008], are defined here
by the text “CandS” (they are referred to by the text “wilcox” in our data files).
4. The Wilcox [2015] lotteries are defined by the text “r” followed immediately by a number.
All prizes are defined in Danish kroner. Each subject was presented with all 60 binary choices,
presented in a random order that varied from subject to subject.
Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994] constructed lotteries to carefully test the “comonotonic
independence” axiom of RDU. Their main lottery pairs consist of 6 sets of 4 pairs. The logic of their
design can be understood by considering the first set, from Wakker, Erev and Weber [1994; Figure
3.1]. The second and third prizes in each pair stay the same within the set of 4 choice pairs. The only
thing that varies from pair to pair is the monetary value of the first prize, and that is common to the
“safe” and “risky” lottery within each pair. Since the first listed prize is a common consequence in
both lotteries within a pair, it should not affect choices under EUT. In the 1st pair the first prize is
only $0.50, and is the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries. The first prize increases to $3.50 for the
2nd pair, and is again the lowest ranked prize for both lotteries: so rank-dependence should have no
effect on choice patterns as the subject moves from the 1st to the 2nd pair. But when we come to the
3rd pair the first prize is $6.50, which makes it the second highest ranked prize for both lotteries; this
is where RDU could have a different prediction than EUT, depending on the extent and nature of
probability weighting. Finally, in the 4th pair the common consequence is the highest ranked prize
for both lotteries, again allowing RDU to predict something different from EUT (and from the
choices in the 3rd pair). Note that this design does not formally require an RDU decision-maker to
choose differently than an EUT decision-maker; it simply encourages it for a priori reasonable levels
of probability weighting. We employ all 24 of their main lottery pairs, and scale the prizes up
considerably.
Loomes and Sugden [1998] pose an important design feature for common ratio tests:
variation in the “gradient” of the EUT-consistent indifference curves within a Marschak-Machina
(MM) triangle. The reason is to generate some choice patterns that are more powerful tests of EUT
for any given risk attitude. Under EUT the slope of the indifference curve within a MM triangle is a
measure of risk aversion. So there always exists some risk attitude such that the subject is indifferent,
and evidence of common ratio violations has virtually zero power; their logic avoids this problem.
We use 30 lottery pairs from their design, with slightly different prizes.
Wilcox [2015] designed lottery tasks for the purpose of robust estimation of EUT and RDU
models at the level of the individual. These lottery pairs span five monetary prize amounts, 300, 600,
1200, 2100 and 4200 kroner, and five probabilities, 0, ¼, ½, ¾ and 1. The prizes are combined in
ten “contexts,” defined as a particular triple of prizes. These lotteries also contain a number of pairs
in which the “EUT-safe” lottery has a higher  EV than the “EUT-risky” lottery: this is designed
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deliberately to evaluate the extent of risk premia deriving from probability pessimism rather than
diminishing marginal utility. Wilcox [2015] documents a wide variety of probability weighting
functions from choices from his complete battery, based on estimates at the individual level. We use
36 lottery pairs from his wider battery.
A final battery of 6 lottery pairs is designed to test the premise  of the calibration puzzle
posed by Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000], using the logic proposed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008;
p.33].
Batteries I, II and III are the same lotteries apart from a scaling of prizes, and were jointly
administered to 220 subjects. Battery IV was administered to the remaining 222 subjects.
Table A1 shows the parameters of the test of the calibration premiss in a format that is easy
to read. As explained in the text, the Risky lotteries were presented to subjects in the gain domain,
adding or subtracting from the Lab Wealth value shown, rather than as positive or negative
deviations from what we refer to as Lab Wealth.
Table A1: Experimental Parameters for Test of Calibration Premis
All currency values in Danish Kroner (1 DKK . $6.643 in September 2015).
Lab Wealth Risky Lottery
Loss Gain Expected Value
150 -80 90 155
225 -120 135 232.5
300 -150 160 305
300 -160 180 310
450 -225 240 457.5
600 -300 320 610
800 -150 160 805
850` -80 90 855
1200 -225 240 1207.5
1275 -120 135 1282.5
1300 -150 160 1305
1350 -80 90 1355
1600 -300 320 1610
1700 -160 180 1710
1950 -225 240 1957.5
2025 -120 135 2032.5
2600 -300 320 2610
2700 -160 180 2710
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Battery I: Low Scale
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |      qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls10       300       .5       900        0      1500       .5       300       .1       900       .8      1500       .1 |
  |     ls11       300       .5       900        0      1500       .5       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls12       300       .1       900       .8      1500       .1       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls13       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .5       900       .4      1500       .1 |
  |     ls14       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls15       300       .5       900       .4      1500       .1       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |     ls18       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300       .1       900      .75      1500      .15 |
  |     ls19       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |      ls2       300       .3       900        0      1500       .7       300      .15       900      .25      1500       .6 |
  |     ls20       300       .1       900      .75      1500      .15       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls21       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .6       900      .25      1500      .15 |
  |     ls22       300       .7       900        0      1500       .3       300       .5       900       .5      1500        0 |
  |     ls23       300       .6       900      .25      1500      .15       300       .5       900       .5      1500        0 |
  |     ls26       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300       .2       900       .6      1500       .2 |
  |     ls27       300       .4       900        0      1500       .6       300       .1       900       .9      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls28       300       .2       900       .6      1500       .2       300       .1       900       .9      1500        0 |
  |     ls29       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300       .5       900       .3      1500       .2 |
  |      ls3       300       .3       900        0      1500       .7       300        0       900       .5      1500       .5 |
  |     ls30       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |     ls31       300       .5       900       .3      1500       .2       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls34       300      .25       900        0      1500      .75       300       .1       900       .6      1500       .3 |
  |     ls35       300      .25       900        0      1500      .75       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls36       300       .1       900       .6      1500       .3       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |     ls37       300       .5       900       .2      1500       .3       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |     ls38       300      .55       900        0      1500      .45       300       .4       900       .6      1500        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls39       300      .55       900        0      1500      .45       300       .5       900       .2      1500       .3 |
  |      ls4       300      .15       900      .25      1500       .6       300        0       900       .5      1500       .5 |
  |      ls5       300      .15       900      .75      1500       .1       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |      ls6       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300        0       900        1      1500        0 |
  |      ls7       300       .6       900        0      1500       .4       300      .15       900      .75      1500       .1 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW1        90      .55      1080      .25      1260       .2        90      .55       810      .25      1620       .2 |
  |   rWEW10       450       .4       540       .4      1080       .2       270       .4       540       .4      1350       .2 |
  |   rWEW11       450       .4       990       .4      1080       .2       270       .4       990       .4      1350       .2 |
  |   rWEW12       450       .4      1080       .2      1440       .4       270       .4      1350       .2      1440       .4 |
  |   rWEW13       450       .7       990       .1      1890       .2       450       .7       630       .1      2250       .2 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW14       990       .1      1080       .7      1890       .2       630       .1      1080       .7      2250       .2 |
  |   rWEW15       990       .1      1710       .7      1890       .2       630       .1      1710       .7      2250       .2 |
  |   rWEW16       990       .1      1890       .2      2340       .7       630       .1      2250       .2      2340       .7 |
  |   rWEW17         0       .5       360       .1       360       .4         0       .5         0       .1       540       .4 |
  |   rWEW18       360       .5       360       .1       360       .4         0       .1       360       .5       540       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW19       360       .1       360       .4       720       .5         0       .1       540       .4       720       .5 |
  |    rWEW2       630      .55      1080      .25      1260       .2       630      .55       810      .25      1620       .2 |
  |   rWEW20       360       .1       360       .4      1080       .5         0       .1       540       .4      1080       .5 |
  |   rWEW21       360       .5       720       .1       720       .4       360       .5       360       .1       900       .4 |
  |   rWEW22       720       .5       720       .1       720       .4       360       .1       720       .5       900       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW23       720       .1       720       .4      1080       .5       360       .1       900       .4      1080       .5 |
  |   rWEW24       720       .1       720       .4      1440       .5       360       .1       900       .4      1440       .5 |
  |    rWEW3      1080      .25      1170      .55      1260       .2       810      .25      1170      .55      1620       .2 |
  |    rWEW4      1080      .25      1260       .2      1710      .55       810      .25      1620       .2      1710      .55 |
  |    rWEW5        90      .65       630       .2       990      .15        90      .65       540       .2      1080      .15 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW6       450      .65       630       .2       990      .15       450      .65       540       .2      1080      .15 |
  |    rWEW7       630       .2       990      .15       810      .65       540       .2       810      .65      1080      .15 |
  |    rWEW8       630       .2       990      .15      1170      .65       540       .2      1080      .15      1170      .65 |
  |    rWEW9        90       .4       450       .4      1080       .2        90       .4       270       .4      1350       .2 |
  |  CandS12         0        0         0        0       800        1         0        0       650       .5       960       .5 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |  CandS14         0        0         0        0       850        1         0        0       770       .5       940       .5 |
  |   CandS2         0        0         0        0       300        1         0        0       150       .5       460       .5 |
  |  CandS22         0        0         0        0      1300        1         0        0      1150       .5      1460       .5 |
  |  CandS24         0        0         0        0      1350        1         0        0      1270       .5      1440       .5 |
  |   CandS4         0        0         0        0       150        1         0        0        70       .5       240       .5 |
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-A3-
Battery II: Middle Scale
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |      qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls10       450       .5      1350        0      2250       .5       450       .1      1350       .8      2250       .1 |
  |     ls11       450       .5      1350        0      2250       .5       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls12       450       .1      1350       .8      2250       .1       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls13       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .5      1350       .4      2250       .1 |
  |     ls14       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls15       450       .5      1350       .4      2250       .1       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |     ls18       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450       .1      1350      .75      2250      .15 |
  |     ls19       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |      ls2       450       .3      1350        0      2250       .7       450      .15      1350      .25      2250       .6 |
  |     ls20       450       .1      1350      .75      2250      .15       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls21       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .6      1350      .25      2250      .15 |
  |     ls22       450       .7      1350        0      2250       .3       450       .5      1350       .5      2250        0 |
  |     ls23       450       .6      1350      .25      2250      .15       450       .5      1350       .5      2250        0 |
  |     ls26       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450       .2      1350       .6      2250       .2 |
  |     ls27       450       .4      1350        0      2250       .6       450       .1      1350       .9      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls28       450       .2      1350       .6      2250       .2       450       .1      1350       .9      2250        0 |
  |     ls29       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450       .5      1350       .3      2250       .2 |
  |      ls3       450       .3      1350        0      2250       .7       450        0      1350       .5      2250       .5 |
  |     ls30       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |     ls31       450       .5      1350       .3      2250       .2       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls34       450      .25      1350        0      2250      .75       450       .1      1350       .6      2250       .3 |
  |     ls35       450      .25      1350        0      2250      .75       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls36       450       .1      1350       .6      2250       .3       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |     ls37       450       .5      1350       .2      2250       .3       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |     ls38       450      .55      1350        0      2250      .45       450       .4      1350       .6      2250        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls39       450      .55      1350        0      2250      .45       450       .5      1350       .2      2250       .3 |
  |      ls4       450      .15      1350      .25      2250       .6       450        0      1350       .5      2250       .5 |
  |      ls5       450      .15      1350      .75      2250       .1       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |      ls6       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450        0      1350        1      2250        0 |
  |      ls7       450       .6      1350        0      2250       .4       450      .15      1350      .75      2250       .1 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW1       135      .55      1620      .25      1890       .2       135      .55      1215      .25      2430       .2 |
  |   rWEW10       675       .4       810       .4      1620       .2       405       .4       810       .4      2025       .2 |
  |   rWEW11       675       .4      1485       .4      1620       .2       405       .4      1485       .4      2025       .2 |
  |   rWEW12       675       .4      1620       .2      2160       .4       405       .4      2025       .2      2160       .4 |
  |   rWEW13       675       .7      1485       .1      2835       .2       675       .7       945       .1      3375       .2 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW14      1485       .1      1620       .7      2835       .2       945       .1      1620       .7      3375       .2 |
  |   rWEW15      1485       .1      2565       .7      2835       .2       945       .1      2565       .7      3375       .2 |
  |   rWEW16      1485       .1      2835       .2      3510       .7       945       .1      3375       .2      3510       .7 |
  |   rWEW17         0       .5       540       .1       540       .4         0       .5         0       .1       810       .4 |
  |   rWEW18       540       .5       540       .1       540       .4         0       .1       540       .5       810       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW19       540       .1       540       .4      1080       .5         0       .1       810       .4      1080       .5 |
  |    rWEW2       945      .55      1620      .25      1890       .2       945      .55      1215      .25      2430       .2 |
  |   rWEW20       540       .1       540       .4      1620       .5         0       .1       810       .4      1620       .5 |
  |   rWEW21       540       .5      1080       .1      1080       .4       540       .5       540       .1      1350       .4 |
  |   rWEW22      1080       .5      1080       .1      1080       .4       540       .1      1080       .5      1350       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW23      1080       .1      1080       .4      1620       .5       540       .1      1350       .4      1620       .5 |
  |   rWEW24      1080       .1      1080       .4      2160       .5       540       .1      1350       .4      2160       .5 |
  |    rWEW3      1620      .25      1755      .55      1890       .2      1215      .25      1755      .55      2430       .2 |
  |    rWEW4      1620      .25      1890       .2      2565      .55      1215      .25      2430       .2      2565      .55 |
  |    rWEW5       135      .65       945       .2      1485      .15       135      .65       810       .2      1620      .15 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW6       675      .65       945       .2      1485      .15       675      .65       810       .2      1620      .15 |
  |    rWEW7       945       .2      1485      .15      1215      .65       810       .2      1215      .65      1620      .15 |
  |    rWEW8       945       .2      1485      .15      1755      .65       810       .2      1620      .15      1755      .65 |
  |    rWEW9       135       .4       675       .4      1620       .2       135       .4       405       .4      2025       .2 |
  |  CandS12         0        0         0        0      1200        1         0        0       975       .5      1440       .5 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |  CandS14         0        0         0        0      1275        1         0        0      1155       .5      1410       .5 |
  |   CandS2         0        0         0        0       450        1         0        0       225       .5       690       .5 |
  |  CandS22         0        0         0        0      1950        1         0        0      1725       .5      2190       .5 |
  |  CandS24         0        0         0        0      2025        1         0        0      1905       .5      2160       .5 |
  |   CandS4         0        0         0        0       225        1         0        0       105       .5       360       .5 |
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-A4-
Battery III: High Scale
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |      qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls10       600       .5      1800        0      3000       .5       600       .1      1800       .8      3000       .1 |
  |     ls11       600       .5      1800        0      3000       .5       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls12       600       .1      1800       .8      3000       .1       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls13       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .5      1800       .4      3000       .1 |
  |     ls14       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls15       600       .5      1800       .4      3000       .1       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |     ls18       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600       .1      1800      .75      3000      .15 |
  |     ls19       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |      ls2       600       .3      1800        0      3000       .7       600      .15      1800      .25      3000       .6 |
  |     ls20       600       .1      1800      .75      3000      .15       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls21       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .6      1800      .25      3000      .15 |
  |     ls22       600       .7      1800        0      3000       .3       600       .5      1800       .5      3000        0 |
  |     ls23       600       .6      1800      .25      3000      .15       600       .5      1800       .5      3000        0 |
  |     ls26       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600       .2      1800       .6      3000       .2 |
  |     ls27       600       .4      1800        0      3000       .6       600       .1      1800       .9      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls28       600       .2      1800       .6      3000       .2       600       .1      1800       .9      3000        0 |
  |     ls29       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600       .5      1800       .3      3000       .2 |
  |      ls3       600       .3      1800        0      3000       .7       600        0      1800       .5      3000       .5 |
  |     ls30       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |     ls31       600       .5      1800       .3      3000       .2       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls34       600      .25      1800        0      3000      .75       600       .1      1800       .6      3000       .3 |
  |     ls35       600      .25      1800        0      3000      .75       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls36       600       .1      1800       .6      3000       .3       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |     ls37       600       .5      1800       .2      3000       .3       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |     ls38       600      .55      1800        0      3000      .45       600       .4      1800       .6      3000        0 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |     ls39       600      .55      1800        0      3000      .45       600       .5      1800       .2      3000       .3 |
  |      ls4       600      .15      1800      .25      3000       .6       600        0      1800       .5      3000       .5 |
  |      ls5       600      .15      1800      .75      3000       .1       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |      ls6       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600        0      1800        1      3000        0 |
  |      ls7       600       .6      1800        0      3000       .4       600      .15      1800      .75      3000       .1 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW1       180      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2       180      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  |   rWEW10       900       .4      1080       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1080       .4      2700       .2 |
  |   rWEW11       900       .4      1980       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1980       .4      2700       .2 |
  |   rWEW12       900       .4      2160       .2      2880       .4       540       .4      2700       .2      2880       .4 |
  |   rWEW13       900       .7      1980       .1      3780       .2       900       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW14      1980       .1      2160       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      2160       .7      4500       .2 |
  |   rWEW15      1980       .1      3420       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      3420       .7      4500       .2 |
  |   rWEW16      1980       .1      3780       .2      4680       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2      4680       .7 |
  |   rWEW17         0       .5       720       .1       720       .4         0       .5         0       .1      1080       .4 |
  |   rWEW18       720       .5       720       .1       720       .4         0       .1       720       .5      1080       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW19       720       .1       720       .4      1440       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      1440       .5 |
  |    rWEW2      1260      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2      1260      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  |   rWEW20       720       .1       720       .4      2160       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      2160       .5 |
  |   rWEW21       720       .5      1440       .1      1440       .4       720       .5       720       .1      1800       .4 |
  |   rWEW22      1440       .5      1440       .1      1440       .4       720       .1      1440       .5      1800       .4 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |   rWEW23      1440       .1      1440       .4      2160       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2160       .5 |
  |   rWEW24      1440       .1      1440       .4      2880       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2880       .5 |
  |    rWEW3      2160      .25      2340      .55      2520       .2      1620      .25      2340      .55      3240       .2 |
  |    rWEW4      2160      .25      2520       .2      3420      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2      3420      .55 |
  |    rWEW5       180      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       180      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    rWEW6       900      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       900      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
  |    rWEW7      1260       .2      1980      .15      1620      .65      1080       .2      1620      .65      2160      .15 |
  |    rWEW8      1260       .2      1980      .15      2340      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15      2340      .65 |
  |    rWEW9       180       .4       900       .4      2160       .2       180       .4       540       .4      2700       .2 |
  |  CandS12         0        0         0        0      1600        1         0        0      1300       .5      1920       .5 |
  |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |  CandS14         0        0         0        0      1700        1         0        0      1540       .5      1880       .5 |
  |   CandS2         0        0         0        0       600        1         0        0       300       .5       920       .5 |
  |  CandS22         0        0         0        0      2600        1         0        0      2300       .5      2920       .5 |
  |  CandS24         0        0         0        0      2700        1         0        0      2540       .5      2880       .5 |
  |   CandS4         0        0         0        0       300        1         0        0       140       .5       480       .5 |
  +----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-A5-
Battery IV
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
  |    qid   prizeA1   probA1   prizeA2   probA2   prizeA3   probA3   prizeB1   probB1   prizeB2   probB2   prizeB3   probB3 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r11       300        0       600        1      2100        0       300       .5       600        0      2100       .5 |
  |    r12       300        0       600      .75      2100      .25       300      .25       600        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r13       300      .25       600      .75      2100        0       300      .75       600        0      2100      .25 |
  |    r14       300        0       600       .5      2100       .5       300      .25       600        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r15       300        0       600      .75      2100      .25       300       .5       600        0      2100       .5 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r16       300        0       600        1      2100        0       300      .75       600        0      2100      .25 |
  |    r17       300      .25       600      .75      4200        0       300       .5       600        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r18       300        0       600        1      4200        0       300       .5       600        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r19       300       .5       600       .5      4200        0       300      .75       600        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r20       300        0       600        1      4200        0       300      .75       600        0      4200      .25 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r21       300        0      1200        1      2100        0       300      .25      1200        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r26       300        0      1200      .75      2100      .25       300       .5      1200        0      2100       .5 |
  |    r28       300      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       300       .5      1200        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r29       300        0      1200      .75      4200      .25       300      .25      1200        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r30       300       .5      1200       .5      4200        0       300      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r31       300      .25      1200       .5      4200      .25       300       .5      1200        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r32       300      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       300      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r33       300        0      1200       .5      4200       .5       300      .25      1200        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r34       300        0      2100        1      4200        0       300      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r35       300      .25      2100      .75      4200        0       300       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r39       300        0      2100      .75      4200      .25       300       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r40       300      .25      2100      .75      4200        0       300      .75      2100        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r41       300        0      2100        1      4200        0       300      .75      2100        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r42       600        0      1200        1      2100        0       600      .25      1200        0      2100      .75 |
  |    r43       600      .25      1200      .75      2100        0       600       .5      1200        0      2100       .5 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r44       600        0      1200        1      2100        0       600      .25      1200      .25      2100       .5 |
  |    r50       600        0      1200        1      2100        0       600      .75      1200        0      2100      .25 |
  |    r51       600      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       600       .5      1200        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r52       600       .5      1200       .5      4200        0       600      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |    r53       600      .25      1200      .75      4200        0       600      .75      1200        0      4200      .25 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r54       600        0      2100        1      4200        0       600      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r55       600      .25      2100      .75      4200        0       600       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r58      1200        0      2100        1      4200        0      1200      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |    r59      1200      .25      2100      .75      4200        0      1200       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |    r60      1200        0      2100      .75      4200      .25      1200      .25      2100        0      4200      .75 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |    r61      1200        0      2100        1      4200        0      1200       .5      2100        0      4200       .5 |
  |  rWEW1       180      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2       180      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  | rWEW10       900       .4      1080       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1080       .4      2700       .2 |
  | rWEW11       900       .4      1980       .4      2160       .2       540       .4      1980       .4      2700       .2 |
  | rWEW12       900       .4      2160       .2      2880       .4       540       .4      2700       .2      2880       .4 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | rWEW13       900       .7      1980       .1      3780       .2       900       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2 |
  | rWEW14      1980       .1      2160       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      2160       .7      4500       .2 |
  | rWEW15      1980       .1      3420       .7      3780       .2      1260       .1      3420       .7      4500       .2 |
  | rWEW16      1980       .1      3780       .2      4680       .7      1260       .1      4500       .2      4680       .7 |
  | rWEW17         0       .5       720       .5         0        0         0       .6         0        0      1080       .4 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | rWEW18         0        0       720        1         0        0         0       .1       720       .5      1080       .4 |
  | rWEW19       720       .5         0        0      1440       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      1440       .5 |
  |  rWEW2      1260      .55      2160      .25      2520       .2      1260      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2 |
  | rWEW20       720       .5         0        0      2160       .5         0       .1      1080       .4      2160       .5 |
  | rWEW21       720       .5      1440       .5         0        0       720       .6         0        0      1800       .4 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | rWEW22      1440        1         0        0         0        0       720       .1      1440       .5      1800       .4 |
  | rWEW23      1440       .5         0        0      2160       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2160       .5 |
  | rWEW24      1440       .5         0        0      2880       .5       720       .1      1800       .4      2880       .5 |
  |  rWEW3      2160      .25      2340      .55      2520       .2      1620      .25      2340      .55      3240       .2 |
  |  rWEW4      2160      .25      2520       .2      3420      .55      1620      .25      3240       .2      3420      .55 |
  |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  |  rWEW5       180      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       180      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
  |  rWEW6       900      .65      1260       .2      1980      .15       900      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15 |
  |  rWEW7      1260       .2      1980      .15      1620      .65      1080       .2      1620      .65      2160      .15 |
  |  rWEW8      1260       .2      1980      .15      2340      .65      1080       .2      2160      .15      2340      .65 |
  |  rWEW9       180       .4       900       .4      2160       .2       180       .4       540       .4      2700       .2 |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-A6-
In Battery I there are 37 distinct prizes, with positive probability, for each subject and 16 distinct
probabilities, distributed as follows:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          6        2.04        2.04
         70 |          1        0.34        2.38
         90 |          6        2.04        4.42
        150 |          2        0.68        5.10
        240 |          1        0.34        5.44
        270 |          4        1.36        6.80
        300 |         51       17.35       24.15
        360 |         16        5.44       29.59
        450 |          8        2.72       32.31
        460 |          1        0.34       32.65
        540 |         10        3.40       36.05
        630 |         10        3.40       39.46
        650 |          1        0.34       39.80
        720 |         12        4.08       43.88
        770 |          1        0.34       44.22
        800 |          1        0.34       44.56
        810 |          6        2.04       46.60
        850 |          1        0.34       46.94
        900 |         44       14.97       61.90
        940 |          1        0.34       62.24
        960 |          1        0.34       62.59
        990 |         10        3.40       65.99
       1080 |         18        6.12       72.11
       1150 |          1        0.34       72.45
       1170 |          4        1.36       73.81
       1260 |          4        1.36       75.17
       1270 |          1        0.34       75.51
       1300 |          1        0.34       75.85
       1350 |          5        1.70       77.55
       1440 |          5        1.70       79.25
       1460 |          1        0.34       79.59
       1500 |         42       14.29       93.88
       1620 |          4        1.36       95.24
       1710 |          4        1.36       96.60
       1890 |          4        1.36       97.96
       2250 |          4        1.36       99.32
       2340 |          2        0.68      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
       prob |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
         .1 |         38       12.93       12.93
        .15 |         16        5.44       18.37
         .2 |         40       13.61       31.97
        .25 |         14        4.76       36.73
         .3 |         12        4.08       40.82
         .4 |         48       16.33       57.14
        .45 |          2        0.68       57.82
         .5 |         46       15.65       73.47
        .55 |         10        3.40       76.87
         .6 |         22        7.48       84.35
        .65 |          8        2.72       87.07
         .7 |         14        4.76       91.84
        .75 |          6        2.04       93.88
         .8 |          2        0.68       94.56
         .9 |          2        0.68       95.24
          1 |         14        4.76      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
The same pattern applies to Battery II and Battery III, where the prize levels are multiplied by 1.5 and
2, respectively. The probability batteries are therefore identical to Battery I, above. In Battery II there
is this distribution of (37) distinct prizes:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          6        2.04        2.04
        105 |          1        0.34        2.38
        135 |          6        2.04        4.42
        225 |          2        0.68        5.10
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        360 |          1        0.34        5.44
        405 |          4        1.36        6.80
        450 |         51       17.35       24.15
        540 |         16        5.44       29.59
        675 |          8        2.72       32.31
        690 |          1        0.34       32.65
        810 |         10        3.40       36.05
        945 |         10        3.40       39.46
        975 |          1        0.34       39.80
       1080 |         12        4.08       43.88
       1155 |          1        0.34       44.22
       1200 |          1        0.34       44.56
       1215 |          6        2.04       46.60
       1275 |          1        0.34       46.94
       1350 |         44       14.97       61.90
       1410 |          1        0.34       62.24
       1440 |          1        0.34       62.59
       1485 |         10        3.40       65.99
       1620 |         18        6.12       72.11
       1725 |          1        0.34       72.45
       1755 |          4        1.36       73.81
       1890 |          4        1.36       75.17
       1905 |          1        0.34       75.51
       1950 |          1        0.34       75.85
       2025 |          5        1.70       77.55
       2160 |          5        1.70       79.25
       2190 |          1        0.34       79.59
       2250 |         42       14.29       93.88
       2430 |          4        1.36       95.24
       2565 |          4        1.36       96.60
       2835 |          4        1.36       97.96
       3375 |          4        1.36       99.32
       3510 |          2        0.68      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
In Battery III there are these tabulations of prizes:
     prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          6        2.04        2.04
        140 |          1        0.34        2.38
        180 |          6        2.04        4.42
        300 |          2        0.68        5.10
        480 |          1        0.34        5.44
        540 |          4        1.36        6.80
        600 |         51       17.35       24.15
        720 |         16        5.44       29.59
        900 |          8        2.72       32.31
        920 |          1        0.34       32.65
       1080 |         10        3.40       36.05
       1260 |         10        3.40       39.46
       1300 |          1        0.34       39.80
       1440 |         12        4.08       43.88
       1540 |          1        0.34       44.22
       1600 |          1        0.34       44.56
       1620 |          6        2.04       46.60
       1700 |          1        0.34       46.94
       1800 |         44       14.97       61.90
       1880 |          1        0.34       62.24
       1920 |          1        0.34       62.59
       1980 |         10        3.40       65.99
       2160 |         18        6.12       72.11
       2300 |          1        0.34       72.45
       2340 |          4        1.36       73.81
       2520 |          4        1.36       75.17
       2540 |          1        0.34       75.51
       2600 |          1        0.34       75.85
       2700 |          5        1.70       77.55
       2880 |          5        1.70       79.25
       2920 |          1        0.34       79.59
       3000 |         42       14.29       93.88
       3240 |          4        1.36       95.24
       3420 |          4        1.36       96.60
       3780 |          4        1.36       97.96
       4500 |          4        1.36       99.32
       4680 |          2        0.68      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        294      100.00
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In Battery IV there are 26 distinct prizes, and 12 distinct probabilities:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |          5        1.89        1.89
        180 |          6        2.26        4.15
        300 |         32       12.08       16.23
        540 |          4        1.51       17.74
        600 |         24        9.06       26.79
        720 |         10        3.77       30.57
        900 |          8        3.02       33.58
       1080 |         10        3.77       37.36
       1200 |         21        7.92       45.28
       1260 |         10        3.77       49.06
       1440 |          7        2.64       51.70
       1620 |          6        2.26       53.96
       1800 |          4        1.51       55.47
       1980 |         10        3.77       59.25
       2100 |         27       10.19       69.43
       2160 |         18        6.79       76.23
       2340 |          4        1.51       77.74
       2520 |          4        1.51       79.25
       2700 |          4        1.51       80.75
       2880 |          4        1.51       82.26
       3240 |          4        1.51       83.77
       3420 |          4        1.51       85.28
       3780 |          4        1.51       86.79
       4200 |         29       10.94       97.74
       4500 |          4        1.51       99.25
       4680 |          2        0.75      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        265      100.00
       prob |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
         .1 |         14        5.28        5.28
        .15 |          8        3.02        8.30
         .2 |         32       12.08       20.38
        .25 |         50       18.87       39.25
         .4 |         24        9.06       48.30
         .5 |         58       21.89       70.19
        .55 |          8        3.02       73.21
         .6 |          2        0.75       73.96
        .65 |          8        3.02       76.98
         .7 |          8        3.02       80.00
        .75 |         38       14.34       94.34
          1 |         15        5.66      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |        265      100.00
For the pooled analyses over all subjects, there are 90 distinct prizes and 16 distinct
probabilities:
      prize |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
          0 |         41        2.02        2.02
         70 |          2        0.10        2.12
         90 |         12        0.59        2.71
        105 |          2        0.10        2.81
        135 |         12        0.59        3.40
        140 |          2        0.10        3.50
        150 |          4        0.20        3.70
        180 |         18        0.89        4.58
        225 |          4        0.20        4.78
        240 |          2        0.10        4.88
        270 |          8        0.39        5.27
        300 |        138        6.80       12.07
        360 |         34        1.68       13.75
        405 |          8        0.39       14.14
        450 |        118        5.82       19.96
        460 |          2        0.10       20.06
        480 |          2        0.10       20.16
        540 |         64        3.15       23.31
        600 |        126        6.21       29.52
        630 |         20        0.99       30.51
        650 |          2        0.10       30.61
        675 |         16        0.79       31.39
-A9-
        690 |          2        0.10       31.49
        720 |         66        3.25       34.75
        770 |          2        0.10       34.84
        800 |          2        0.10       34.94
        810 |         32        1.58       36.52
        850 |          2        0.10       36.62
        900 |        112        5.52       42.14
        920 |          2        0.10       42.24
        940 |          2        0.10       42.34
        945 |         20        0.99       43.32
        960 |          2        0.10       43.42
        975 |          2        0.10       43.52
        990 |         20        0.99       44.50
       1080 |         90        4.44       48.94
       1150 |          2        0.10       49.04
       1155 |          2        0.10       49.14
       1170 |          8        0.39       49.53
       1200 |         23        1.13       50.67
       1215 |         12        0.59       51.26
       1260 |         38        1.87       53.13
       1270 |          2        0.10       53.23
       1275 |          2        0.10       53.33
       1300 |          4        0.20       53.52
       1350 |         98        4.83       58.35
       1410 |          2        0.10       58.45
       1440 |         43        2.12       60.57
       1460 |          2        0.10       60.67
       1485 |         20        0.99       61.66
       1500 |         84        4.14       65.80
       1540 |          2        0.10       65.89
       1600 |          2        0.10       65.99
       1620 |         62        3.06       69.05
       1700 |          2        0.10       69.15
       1710 |          8        0.39       69.54
       1725 |          2        0.10       69.64
       1755 |          8        0.39       70.03
       1800 |         92        4.53       74.57
       1880 |          2        0.10       74.67
       1890 |         16        0.79       75.46
       1905 |          2        0.10       75.55
       1920 |          2        0.10       75.65
       1950 |          2        0.10       75.75
       1980 |         30        1.48       77.23
       2025 |         10        0.49       77.72
       2100 |         27        1.33       79.05
       2160 |         64        3.15       82.21
       2190 |          2        0.10       82.31
       2250 |         92        4.53       86.84
       2300 |          2        0.10       86.94
       2340 |         16        0.79       87.73
       2430 |          8        0.39       88.12
       2520 |         12        0.59       88.71
       2540 |          2        0.10       88.81
       2565 |          8        0.39       89.21
       2600 |          2        0.10       89.31
       2700 |         14        0.69       90.00
       2835 |          8        0.39       90.39
       2880 |         14        0.69       91.08
       2920 |          2        0.10       91.18
       3000 |         84        4.14       95.32
       3240 |         12        0.59       95.91
       3375 |          8        0.39       96.30
       3420 |         12        0.59       96.90
       3510 |          4        0.20       97.09
       3780 |         12        0.59       97.68
       4200 |         29        1.43       99.11
       4500 |         12        0.59       99.70
       4680 |          6        0.30      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |      2,029      100.00
       prob |      Freq.     Percent        Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
         .1 |        242       11.93       11.93
        .15 |        104        5.13       17.05
         .2 |        272       13.41       30.46
        .25 |        134        6.60       37.06
         .3 |         72        3.55       40.61
         .4 |        312       15.38       55.99
        .45 |         12        0.59       56.58
         .5 |        334       16.46       73.04
        .55 |         68        3.35       76.39
         .6 |        134        6.60       83.00
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        .65 |         56        2.76       85.76
         .7 |         92        4.53       90.29
        .75 |         74        3.65       93.94
         .8 |         12        0.59       94.53
         .9 |         12        0.59       95.12
          1 |         99        4.88      100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
      Total |      2,029      100.00
Figure A1 displays the raw choices against the difference in EV, and Figure A2 repeats that
display differentiated by quartiles of Net Wealth. The pattern of choices does not differ with Net
Wealth, at least at this level of description.
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Appendix B: Additional Results at the Level of the Individual Subject
By and large the estimates at the level of the individual are consistent with the conclusions from the
pooled models. We continue to find considerable support for the PAI specification converging to the NAI
specification, and virtually no support for the FAI specification. But we do observe some considerable
heterogeneity, and some interesting special cases.
Unconditional Tests of Null Asset Integration
If we assume that every individual is characterized by EUT-PAI, we find that 220 out of 330 valid
estimates, or 67%, have p-values on the test of the hypothesis ω = 0 that are below 5%. Hence we conclude that
67% of the sample deviate from NAI. Of course, recall from the text that only 30% of the sample (or 32% of the
solved cases) were deemed consistent with EUT at the 5% level.
If we assume that every individual is characterized by RDU-PAI, we find that 264 out of 338 valid
estimates, or 78%, have p-values on the test of the hypothesis ω = 0 that are below 5%. Hence we conclude that
78% of the sample deviate from NAI. As noted, we find that 70% of the sample (or 68% of the solved cases)
were deemed consistent with RDU at the 5% level.
Unconditional Estimates of Parameters
Table B1 shows tabulations of estimates assuming that every subject is characterized by an EUT-PAI
specification, although the estimates are specific to that individual. Table B2 does likewise, assuming that every
subject is characterized by a RDU-PAI specification, again where the estimates are specific to that individual.
We report estimates in intervals, because the confidentiality of access to individual data within Statistics
Denmark does not allow us to report estimates for any one individual. Nonetheless, these tabulations provide a
rich characterization.
Panel A within each table show the range of estimates of ω. We find that 71% of the subjects have an
estimate of ω that is less than 0.05 under the EUT-PAI specification, and 62% under the RDU-PAI
specification. Again, these are the same subjects, just with different specifications assumed: the main text
presents comparable results when we condition on whether an individual is better characterized as EUT or
RDU. However, even these unconditional estimates confirm the tendency clear from the pooled estimates, that
many individuals are approximating NAI. Of course, we need to match these ω estimates with the Net Wealth w
that each subject has, and we do that below.
Panel B within each table shows the range of estimates of r. Under EUT, we find 36.9% (= 11.3 + 25.6)
with estimates signifying modest risk aversion: 0 < r < 1. On the other hand, 34% have estimates of r that
exceed 1, and some of those estimates could be quite large. We have not in these tabulations conditioned on the
statistical significance of these estimates; that is done in the main text. Under RDU the comparable fractions are
26.9% and 30.5%, respectively. Of course, under RDU the coefficient r is only a part of the characterization of
risk attitudes, and one has to attend to the effects of probability weighting as well.
Panel C within each table shows a cross-tabulation of these estimates of ω and r. We immediately
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observe that 129 (= 107 + 22) of the 150 estimates of r > 1 under EUT are for individuals with extremely low ω
estimates below 0.05. For RDU we find that 108 (= 35 + 73) of the 135 estimates of r > 1 are for individuals
with ω below 0.05.
Panel D is an important complement to Panel A, since it multiplies the estimate of ω for the individual
by the Net Wealth w of the same individual, telling us in effect what “weighted baseline wealth” the individual
aggregates with experimental income. Under EUT we have 25% of the subjects with weighted baseline wealth
less than 10 kroner, which is effectively zero. But we have 27% with weighted baseline wealth between 10 and
1,000 kroner, 21% between 1,000 and 100,000 kroner, and 14% over 100,000 kroner. So this is an important
pattern of heterogeneity, illustrating why it is important to look at the interaction of the ω parameter with
individual wealth w. Under RDU we get even higher weighted baseline wealth levels: only 8% below 10 kroner,
only 14% between 10 and 1,000 kroner, but 40% between 10,000 and 100,000 kroner, and 17% over 100,000
kroner.
Panel E provides a cross-tabulation of these estimates of ω×w and r, akin to Panel C.
Estimates of Parameters Conditional on Model of Risk Preferences and Statistical Significance
Here we document the findings after conditioning on which model of decision-making under risk best
characterizes each individual (EUT or RDU), and then conditioning on the statistical significance of parameter estimates
(e.g., if the estimate of ω > 0 but is not statistically significantly different from 0, we set it to 0). This way of
presenting results is more intuitive that ignoring the statistical significance of estimates: one should not look at
EUT results for an individual better characterized as RDU, and one should not ignore the statistical significance
of results when reporting findings. As it happens, for completeness we later report estimates at the level of the
individual that do not condition on statistical significance. 
All statements about statistical significance will be using a 5% two-sided test, but we have complete
results using a 1% or 10% level, and nothing changes with respect to the qualitative conclusions. We also have
to condition statements on the fact that, as always happens with individual-level estimation, there is a fraction of
individuals and model specifications that do not solve numerically.
We find that a relatively high 68% of the sample are better characterized as RDU decision-makers than
EUT decision-makers. The formal test here is that π(p)=p, which is the case when η = φ = 1 from the
probability weighting function (12). We say that this fraction is relatively high given our priors from the same
calculations with university student pools from the United States (Harrison and Ng [2016]). This 68% refers to
287 subjects out of the 421 for which we had valid estimates; there were only 21 subjects for which we had no
estimates of either the EUT or RDU specification. So we have a clear majority of subjects for whom we should
not look at results that assume EUT.
Table B3 collates the individual estimates. Panel A show the range of estimates of ω, and we find that
82% [89%] of the subjects have an estimate of ω that is less than 0.001 [0.05] under the preferred PAI
specification (viz., EUT-PAI or RDU-PAI). Recall that this includes all subjects with statistically insignificant
estimates of ω, irrespective of the point estimate of ω, which we set to zero. Of course, before we conclude that
these individuals are approximating NAI, we need to match these ω estimates with the Net Wealth w that each
subject has.
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Panel B shows the range of estimates of r, and we see that 39% (= 19% + 20%) of subjects have an
estimate that lies between 0 and 1, reflecting modest risk aversion.1 Some of these cases reflect estimates of r
that are not statistically significantly different from zero. Of course, under RDU the coefficient r is only a part
of the characterization of risk attitudes, and one has to attend to the effects of probability weighting as well.
Panel C shows a cross-tabulation of these estimates of ω and r. We find that 152 ( = 61+77+9+5) of the
442 subjects have estimates of ω between 0 and 0.05 and estimates of r between 0 and 1, reflecting modest risk
aversion. We find that 310 (= 152+147+11) of the 442 subjects have estimates of ω between 0 and 0.05 and
estimates of r above or equal to 0 reflecting risk aversion. 
Panel D is an important complement to Panel A, since it multiplies the estimate of ω for the individual
by the Net Wealth w of the same individual, telling us in effect what weighted baseline wealth  the individual
aggregates with experimental income. We find that 77% of subjects behave as if employing a weighted baseline
wealth less than 10 kroner, which is effectively zero in terms of implications for calibration. A further 6% of the
sample have weighted baseline wealth between 10 kroner and 1,000 kroner (.$150), 8% have weighted baseline
wealth between 1,000 and 100,000 kroner (.$15,053), and 3% have weighted baseline wealth over 100,000
kroner. So this is an important pattern of heterogeneity, illustrating, in contrast to Panel A, why it is important
to look at the interaction of the ω parameter with individual Net Wealth w. Panel E provides a cross-tabulation
of these estimates of ω×w and r, akin to Panel C.
Figures B1 and B2 display the implications for the Arrow-Pratt measure of RRA in (4) for the average
parameter values of representative individuals of two sub-samples of subjects with non-trivial levels of weighted
baseline wealth ω×w. We focus on the implications for RRA from the utility function, and set aside implications
from any probability weighting.
As it happens, there is relatively little probability weighting from a substantive point of view, even if it is
statistically significant. Figures B3 and B4 display the estimated probability weighting functions and implications
for decision weights, corresponding to the utility function estimates reflected in Figures B1 and B2, respectively.
The left panel of Figures B3 and B4 shows the probability weighting function. The decision weight for the top
prize is read directly off the probability weighting function, and the decision weights for the smaller prizes are
then derived according to (11a) and (11b). The right panel of Figures B3 and B4 shows an example in which the
objective probabilities on three prizes are each assumed to be a, in order to illustrate the pure effect of
probability weighting, and the dashed line then shows the effect of the probability weighting curvature in the left
panel. So we see in Figure B4, for example, that the weight given to the best prize increases slightly from 0.33,
while the weight given to the worst prize decreases slight from 0.33.
Returning to Figures B1 and B2, Figure B1 shows results for a representative agent with weighted
baseline wealth between 10,000 kroner and 100,000 kroner. Figure B2 shows results for a representative agent
with weighted baseline wealth between 100,000 kroner and 1 million kroner. Figures B1 and B2 each pool sub-
samples of individual estimates, spanning EUT-PAI and RDU-PAI subjects. In each case we observe
considerable variation in RRA as wealth varies, but no levels of RRA that would seem implausible in the sense
1 We merge the cells for the case in which 0.5 # r < 1 and r $ 1 to avoid reporting cells referring to
individuals that have too small a frequency count, so as to ensure confidentiality. We retain the detailed rows
to facilitate comparison with unconditional tabulations below.
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of the calibration critiques. These are important sub-samples, because their levels of weighted baseline wealth
mean that they do not collapse to NAI, where we know that small stakes and large stakes risk aversion are
plausible for our subjects. In the case of the individual agents included in Figure B1 we have an example of PAI,
with ω = 0.045 (hence weighted baseline wealth of between 450 kroner and 4,500 kroner), ρ = 0.66 and σ = 7.7.
This elasticity of substitution is not 4, but it is very high for all practical purposes. But the fact that only 4.5% of
wealth is integrated with experimental prizes, and this represents an amount in the range of the experimental
prizes, points to PAI. For the individual agents in Figure B2 we have another example of PAI, with ω = 0.13, ρ
= 0.31 and σ = 1.5.
It is possible to characterize the payoff calibration implications for the complete set of individual
estimates by calculating the CE values for a wide range of lotteries that are comparable to those in Panel B of
Table 3 in the text, with varying values of H and L and probability ½.  For each subject we can undertake these
calculations using the estimates for that individual and the Net Wealth for that individual. EUT subjects are
simply RDU subjects for whom η = φ = 1, so can be included in the same simulations correctly. We can then
summarize the ratio of CE to EV across all subjects and simulated choices: there is an average of 0.83 and a
median of 0.96. The complete distribution of these ratios, shown in Figure B5, does reveal some low ratios, and
some ratios indicating risk-loving choices, reflecting the heterogeneity of risk preferences and lotteries evaluated.
But the overall pattern confirms our general finding of plausible patterns of risk aversion.
Estimates of Parameters Conditional Only on Model of Risk Preferences
Table B4 shows tabulations of individual estimates in which we condition only on the descriptively best
model of risk preferences for each subject. As noted above, we find that 68% of the sample are better
characterized as RDU decision-makers than EUT decision-makers. The formal test here is that π(p)=p, which is
the case when η = φ = 1 from the probability weighting function (12). In Table B4 the estimates of ω and r for
each individual are taken from the estimates for that individual conditional on the preferred model (EUT or
RDU) for that individual. Hence they tend to look more like the tabulations in Table B2 than the tabulations in
Table B1.
Again, the tabulations in Table B4 are provided to allow one to see the effect of conditioning solely on
the model of risk preferences, in contrast to Table B3 which conditions on the model or risk preferences and the
statistical significance of parameter estimates.
Additional Reference
Harrison, Glenn W., and Ng, Jia Min, “Evaluating the Expected Welfare Gain from Insurance,” Journal of Risk
and Insurance, 83(1), 2016, 91-120.
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Table B1: EUT-PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 232 52.5 52.5
0.001 < ω # 0.05 82 18.6 71
0.05 < ω # 0.3 49 11.1 82.1
ω > 0.3 26 5.9 88
Missing 53 12 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 76 17.2 17.2
0 # r < 0.5 50 11.3 28.5
0.5 # r < 1 113 25.6 54.1
r $ 1 150 34 87.1
Missing 53 12 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 34 20 71 107 0 232
0.001 < ω # 0.05 33  16 11 22 0 82
0.05 < ω # 0.3 6 10 20 13 0 49
ω > 0.3 3 4 11 8 0 26
Missing 0 0 0 0 53 53
Total 76 50 113 150 53 442
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Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 110 24.9 34.9
10 < ω × w # 1,000 121 27.4 52.3
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 94 21.3 75.5
ω × w > 100,000 64 14.5 88
Missing 53 12 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 17 5 32 56 0 110
10 < ω × w # 1,000 17 17 44 43 0 121
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 32 17 14 31 0 94
ω × w > 100,000 10 11 23 20 0 64
Missing 0 0 0 0 53 53
Total 76 50 113 150 53 442
-A18-
Table B2: RDU-PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 95 21.5 21.5
0.001 < ω # 0.05 178 40.3 61.8
0.05 < ω # 0.3 30 6.8 68.6
ω > 0.3 50 11.3 79.9
Missing 89 20.1 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 99 22.4 22.4
0 # r < 0.5 38 8.6 31
0.5 # r < 1 81 18.3 49.3
r $ 1 135 30.5 79.9
Missing 89 20.1 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 19 8 33 35 0 95
0.001 < ω # 0.05 53 14 38 73 0 178
0.05 < ω # 0.3 9 6 5 10 0 30
ω > 0.3 18 10 5 17 0 50
Missing 0 0 0 0 89 89
Total 99 38 81 135 89 442
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Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 37 8.4 8.4
10 < ω × w # 1,000 63 14.2 22.6
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 178 40.3 62.9
ω × w > 100,000 75 17 79.9
Missing 89 20.1 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 9 4 18 6 0 37
10 < ω × w # 1,000 15 4 18 26 0 63
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 53 11 37 77 0 178
ω × w > 100,000 22 19 8 26 0 75
Missing 0 0 0 0 53 53
Total 99 38 81 135 53 442
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Table B3: PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters Conditional on
the Model of Risk Preferences and Statistical Significance
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 362 82 82
0.001 < ω # 0.05 33 7 89
0.05 < ω # 0.3 13 3 92
ω > 0.3 5 1 93
Missing 29 7 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 85 19 19
0 # r < 0.5 84 19 38
0.5 # r < 1 90 20 58
r $ 1 162 37 95
Missing 21 5 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 77 61 77 147 0 362
0.001 < ω # 0.05 8 9 5 11 0 33
0.05 < ω # 0.3 0 0 7 4 2 13
ω > 0.3 0 4 0 0 1 5
Missing 0 10 1 0 18 29
Total 85 84 90 162 21 442
Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 339 77 77
10 < ω × w # 1,000 25 6 83
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 34 8 90
ω × w > 100,000 15 3 93
Missing 29 7 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 76 50 73 140 0 339
10 < ω × w # 1,000 0 10 7 6 2 25
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 7 11 6 10 0 34
ω × w > 100,000 0 15 4 6 0 15
Missing 1 8 0 0 29 38
Total 85 84 90 162 31 442
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Table B4: PAI Estimates of Individual Parameters Conditional
Only on the Model of Risk Preferences
Panel A: Tabulation of ω Point Estimates
Range for ω Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω # 0.001 154 34.8 34.8
0.001 < ω # 0.05 168 38 72.8
0.05 < ω # 0.3 43 9.7 82.6
ω > 0.3 48 10.9 93.4
Missing 29 6.6 100
Total 442 100
Panel B: Tabulation of r Point Estimates
Range for r Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
r < 0 102 23.1 23.1
0 # r < 0.5 45 10.2 33.3
0.5 # r < 1 93 21 54.3
r $ 1 173 39.1 93.4
Missing 20 6.6 100
Total 442 100
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of ω and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω # 0.001 25 12 44 73 0 154
0.001 < ω # 0.05 57 14 31 66 0 168
0.05 < ω # 0.3 5 10 11 17 0 43
ω > 0.3 15 9 7 17 0 48
Missing 0 0 0 0 29 29
Total 102 45 93 173 29 442
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Panel D: Tabulation of ω × w Point Estimates
Range for ω × w in DKK Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
0 < ω × w # 10 77 17.4 17.4
10 < ω × w # 1,000 86 19.5 36.9
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 164 37.1 74
ω × w > 100,000 86 19.5 93.4
Missing 29 6.6 100
Total 442 100
Panel E: Cross-Tabulation of ω × w and r Point Estimates
Range for r                
Range for ω × w in DKK r  < 0 0 # r < 0.5 0.5 # r < 1 r $ 1 Missing Total
0 < ω × w # 10 11 6 26 34 0 77
10 < ω × w # 1,000 18 7 25 36 0 86
1,000 < ω × w # 100,000 51 12 30 71 0 164
ω × w > 100,000 22 20 12 32 0 86
Missing 0 0 0 0 29 29
Total 102 45 93 173 29 442
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Appendix C: Additional Results with a Different Definition of the Certainty Equivalent
In the text the definition of a Certainty Equivalent (CE) when one allows for partial asset
integration is provided by (14), repeated below. An alternative definition is formally possible, and
although we do not believe it to be a “natural definition” in terms of the economic implications, we
demonstrate here that it does not change our general conclusions if we use it. The analysis here uses
the pooled estimates, not the estimates at the level of individuals.
Let H denote a high prize and L denote a low prize, for H>L. The CE in Panel A of Table
C1 is then the sure amount of money that has the same expected utility to the individual as the
lottery that pays H with probability p and L with probability (1-p). In Panel A of Table C1, and in
Panel B of  Table 2 of the main text, the CE solves
U(w, CE) = p × U(w, H) + (1-p) × U(w, L). (14)
So this CE solves for risky income in the experiment, and the stakes are chosen to be within the
payoff domain in our experiments. 
In Panel B of Table C1 the CE solves instead for risky wealth, holding constant the
experimental income at zero, and the stakes are chosen to span “life-changing” changes in wealth for
most Danes. Formally, for Panel B of Table C1 the CE solves
U(w+CE, 0) = p × U(w+H, 0) + (1-p) × U(w+L, 0). (14N)
This is the alternative definition of CE referred to above. We believe this definition of the CE to be
less interesting, since it amounts to us saying to the subjects, as they come in to the session: “We can
give you a certain amount of money, CE, to add to the wealth w that you have outside of the lab,
and agree not to participate in the experiment and hence get $0 payoffs from the experiment with
certainty.” The definition of CE in (14), on the other hand, implies a much more natural economic
scenario.
Another issue with this CE calculation, raised by a referee, may be stated as follows: if one
posed the CE thought experiment in question to the subject, would we change the way they evaluate
lab income and wealth? Could there be something contextual in behavioral responses to that sort of
task, rather than the one we posed (pick between to lotteries over lab income)? This is a reasonable
concern, and although the formal mathematics of the calculation defined by (14N) allow us to
compute CE, it requires us to assume that there is no context-effect from posing these sorts of
questions with respect to changes in wealth. This assumption is not obvious a priori, and at the very
least can and should be tested behaviorally.
The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table C1 is 0.362, and most are much higher: these ratios
are hardly implausible in the sense of the term used by Hansson [1988], Rabin [2000], Neilson
[2001], Rieger and Wang [2006], Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Safra and Segal [2008].
The same point applies for our evaluation of the CE in the RDU case. Using the same
lotteries as in Panel B of Table 3 and Panel A of Table C1, in Panel A of Table C2 the CE now
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solves
U(w, CE) = h(p) × U(w, H) + (1-h(p)) × U(w, L), (15)
and in Panel B of Table C2 the CE solves
U(w+CE, 0) = h(p) × U(w+H, 0) + (1-h(p)) × U(w+L, 0). (15N)
The smallest ratio of CE to EV in Table C2 is 0.478, and most are much higher, exactly as in Table
C1. In fact, in one case the CE exceeds the EV, but this is completely intuitive: the probability on
the high prize of 400,000 kroner (.$60,214) is 0.010, and the low prize is only 100 kroner.2 In
general the ratios in Tables C1 and C2 are similar. 
2 From the left panel of Figure C1 we can, just, see that the probability weighting is “optimistic” for
very small probabilities, so this probability of 0.010 becomes 0.0171, which is in turn the decision weight on
the top prize. Assuming a linear utility function for simplicity, the decision-weighted EV is then 0.0171 × 400,000
+ (1-0.0171) × 100 = 6,962, which is 1.698 times the EV of 4,099 kroner. The actual CE is slightly less, at
6,937 kroner, taking into account the fact that UO<0 for the RDU specification in Table 3.
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Table C1: Implied Certainty Equivalents Using EUT-PAI Model
Calculations with average wealth
High Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of High Prize
Low Prize
(DKK)
Expected
Value (DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
A. Risky Lottery in Experiment
200 0.5 100 150 145 0.965
500 0.5 100 300 252 0.84
1000 0.5 100 550 402 0.73
2000 0.5 100 1,050 663 0.631
5000 0.5 100 2,550 1,350 0.529
5000 0.01 100 149 109 0.732
5000 0.1 100 590 214 0.362
5000 0.3 100 1,570 626 0.399
5000 0.7 100 3,530 2,459 0.697
5000 0.9 100 4,510 4,025 0.892
B. Risky Lottery in Wealth
200 0.5 100 150 150 0.999
1000 0.5 100 550 550 0.999
5000 0.5 100 2,550 2,549 0.999
100000 0.5 100 50,050 49,794 0.995
11000 0.5 10,000 10,500 10,500 0.999
50000 0.5 10,000 30,000 29,959 0.999
100000 0.5 10,000 55,000 54,792 0.996
400000 0.5 10,000 205,000 201,286 0.982
400000 0.01 100 4,099 3,945 0.962
400000 0.3 100 120,070 116,793 0.973
400000 0.5 100 200,050 196,139 0.98
400000 0.7 100 280,030 276,738 0.988
400000 0.9 100 360,010 358,596 0.996
-A31-
Table C2: Implied Certainty Equivalents Using RDU-PAI Model
Calculations with average wealth
Large Prize
(DKK)
Probability
of Large Prize
Small Prize
(DKK)
Expected
Value (DKK)
Certainty
Equivalent (DKK) Ratio
A. Risky Lottery in Experiment
200 0.5 $100 $150 141 0.937
500 0.5 $100 $300 244 0.813
1,000 0.5 $100 $550 395 0.717
2,000 0.5 $100 $1,050 668 0.636
5,000 0.5 $100 $2,550 1,418 0.556
5,000 0.01 $100 $149 126 0.848
5,000 0.1 $100 $590 290 0.492
5,000 0.3 $100 $1,570 751 0.478
5,000 0.7 $100 $3,530 2,371 0.672
5,000 0.9 $100 $4,510 3,800 0.842
B. Risky Lottery in Wealth
200 0.5 $100 $150 144 0.959
1,000 0.5 $100 $550 495 0.9
5,000 0.5 $100 $2,550 2,251 0.883
100,000 0.5 $100 $50,050 43,769 0.875
11,000 0.5 $10,000 $10,500 10,439 0.994
50,000 0.5 $10,000 $30,000 27.530 0.918
100,000 0.5 $10,000 $55,000 49,359 0.897
400,000 0.5 $10,000 $205,000 178,473 0.871
400,000 0.01 $100 $4,099 6,937 1.692
400,000 0.3 $100 $120,070 105,797 0.881
400,000 0.5 $100 $200,050 172,774 0.864
400,000 0.7 $100 $280,030 247,009 0.882
400,000 0.9 $100 $360,010 336,228 0.934
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Appendix D: Related Literature
The closest data source is compiled by Schechter [2007], based on a sample of 188 rural
Paraguayan households that made one lottery choice in an experiment and provided self-reported
measures of daily income. She focuses on the integration of experimental payoffs with daily income
on the day of the experiment, assuming it is all consumed on that day, and also with the integration
of experimental payoffs with the present value of that daily income when inter-day savings are
allowed. In each case she only considers full asset integration, in which experimental payoffs are added
to daily income, and the intertemporal utility function is linear in current and future utility. She also
reports the availability of a measure of household physical wealth, given by the self-reported value of
land, animals and tools. She does not report any measures of financial wealth, which may have been
negligible for this population.
Several studies of insurance data have attempted to estimate large-stakes risk aversion. The
problem with naturally occurring data, of course, is identification. This is where the trade-off
between controlled lab or field experiments and naturally occurring data is most clearly seen. In our
case we have artefactual field experiments with non-students that are representative of a broader
population, so we have “complete control” over the design of the lotteries. This permits us to
conduct direct tests of one of the premises of the calibration critique, as well as ensure that we
obtain well-identified estimates for each individual of EUT and RDU models of risk preferences.
We also have the unusual advantage of being able to merge in naturally occurring data, the Net
Wealth of the same individuals that made these lottery choices. Reliance on naturally occurring data
generally makes it impossible to draw the sorts of inferences we can, but of course has the advantage
of referring to non-artefactual choices over risk. We see the two approaches as complementary, each
with strengths and limitations. In some cases naturally occurring data allows relatively refined
inferences about large-stakes risk aversion, as illustrated in several classic studies looking at behavior
towards insurance deductibles.
Cohen and Einav [2007] examine a rich data-set of choices over menus of deductibles and
premium payments for auto insurance that varied across individuals. They know the premium
offered, but do not know the subjective perception of the risk of a claim, or the risk that the claim
will be paid in full. To proxy the latter they assume that individuals have accurate point estimates of
the true distribution, a tenuous assumption, even for experienced drivers. Moreover, they must
assume EUT, since they have no way to identify non-EUT models of risk preferences, and hence
the calibration implications of such preferences.3 Certain non-EUT models of risk preferences, such
as RDU, have been shown to dramatically affect the valuation of insurance when calibrated to
estimates from real choices (Hansen, Jacobsen and Lau [2016]). 
The same confounding issue arises in the evaluation by Sydnor [2010] of choices over
deductibles on home insurance. By choosing lower deductibles the individual is paying a lower,
certain premium, in return for a risky return given by the claim rate, and the subjective perception of
3 Cohen and Einav [2007] explicitly “take a neutral position” (p. 746) with respect to the calibration
implications of their analysis, recognizing that “avoiding this debate is also a drawback” (p. 747) of their
approach. Of course, their analysis was not intended to contribute to the debate over the calibration critique.
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how often the individual expects to make a claim in the next year. Since these are lower deductibles,
there is no risk attached to the amount that is saved by the lower deductible, so risk preferences do
not play a role in this decision under EUT. But it is easy to imagine an RDU agent viewing the actual
claims rate “optimistically” enough to justify these deductibles.4 Again, nothing in these data allow
one to identify the parameters of the simplest RDU model, hence identify the calibration
implications for such a specification.
Barseghyan, Molinari, O’Donoghue and Teitelbaum [2013] is an important advance in the
analysis of insurance deductible choice. They exploit the fact that the decision-makers in their
sample had a choice from multiple deductibles, and recognize that this allows them to identify the
role of diminishing marginal utility and probability weighting, since these two channels for a risk
premium have different implications at different deductible levels. They also recognize that what
they call probability weighting might also be simply subjective risk perceptions that differ from the
true claims rate, an important issue we return to later. Their striking result is that probability
overweighting with respect to claims is, along with diminishing marginal utility, a central determinant
of the risk preferences of these deductible choices. They use semi-parametric methods to infer the
probability weighting function. Although such methods have some obvious attractions, they can lead
to a priori implausible results, such as the massive jump discontinuity from the infamous probability
weighting function sketch of Kahneman and Tversky [1979; Figure 4, p. 283]: claims rates of zero
imply weighted claims rates of 6.5%, with 95% confidence intervals spanning 6% and 10% (Figure
1). They also estimate CRRA coefficients of 0.37 and 0.21 (p. 2524), comparable to the 0.48 we
estimate in our RDU-PAI specification (Table 5). 
When it comes to implications for the calibration critique, Barseghyan et al. [2013; p. 2527]
hedge, suggesting that their relatively low estimate of UO “suggests that it may be possible” to
explain low-stakes and high-stakes risk aversion while maintaining “standard risk aversion,” by
which they mean some degree of diminishing marginal utility. If one interprets their probability
weighting in terms of an RDU model, they still require a deviation from EUT. On the other hand,
they openly acknowledge that their analysis “does not enable us to say whether households are
engaging in probability weighting per se or whether their subjective beliefs about risk simply do not
correspond to the objective probabilities.” (p. 2527). The latter explanation when it requires
additivity is just Subjective Expected Utility, which does not require that subjective beliefs be correct
or even updated according to Bayes Rule.5 We return to the role of subjective beliefs below.
4 For example, the modal choice from the sample was to pay $100 to get a $500 reduction in the
deductible. The actual claims rate was 0.043 in this case, at least for the claims that resulted in a payout. An
RDU decision-maker with a power probability weighting function π(p) = pγ would only need γ = 0.5 to have a
weighted probability and decision weight of 0.21, exceeding the 0.2 needed to justify the purchase. And it is
reasonable to expect that some households might perceive the true probability as higher than 0.043, requiring
even less optimism to justify the purchase. The estimated probability weighting function of Barseghyan et al.
[2013; Figure 2 or Figure 4], for comparable choices by samples from comparable populations, implies a
weighted probability of roughly 0.11 if one uses the actual claims rate of 0.043. Of course, this is still a
violation of EUT, which is the general point being made by Sydnor [2010].  
5 Some economists view Bayes Rule as a part of Subjective Expected Utility, but it is not. The
literature in behavioral finance is clear about these two being separate, even if it challenges the descriptive
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It is possible to write down non-EUT models that can explain small-stakes risk aversion as
well as large-stakes risk aversion. For instance, Ang, Bekaert and Liu [2005], building on Epstein and
Zin [1990], show that a recursive utility specification with a non-EU, first-order6 risk averse certainty
equivalent, can account for both types of risk aversion. Our approach does not require than one
adopt a non-EU specification, but of course allows for that as we illustrate with our RDU-PAI
specification.
An important feature of Barberis et al. [2006] is the evaluation of small-stakes risks that are
delayed, rather than resolved immediately. This requirement differentiates their specification from
the model of Ang et al. [2005], who implicitly require these risks to be resolved immediately.
Modeling risk over time raises many new issues, which we discussed earlier: in effect it takes us to
the generalization of our approach to model multiattribute or multivariate risks.
Loss aversion was suggested by Rabin [2000] and Rabin and Thaler [2001] as a possible
explanation for first-order risk aversion over small-stakes lotteries. These suggestions are more
formally developed in Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006], discussed below. Our results show that
loss aversion is not necessary to account for small-stakes risk aversion and large-stakes risk aversion:
none of the lotteries our subjects faced were in the loss domain or mixed domain, if one views the
status quo as the reference point. Just as we were able to extend our PAI approach to consider
RDU, one could extend it to Cumulative Prospect Theory, with appropriate formal modifications
noted earlier.
An alternative approach to allowing for partial asset integration, adopted by Harrison, List
and Towe [2007] and Heinemann [2008], is to assume σ = 4 and estimate the composite Ω such that
v = Ω+y is employed by the decision-maker using a utility function such as (3). This approach is
useful, as far as it goes, to move away from the pure “utility of income” EUT model. However, it
does not address the manner in which experimental prizes are integrated with wealth, which is the
focus of our analysis.
validity of both. Barberis and Thaler [2005; p.1] open their survey by noting that “The traditional finance
paradigm [...] seeks to understand financial markets using models in which agents are ‘rational.’ Rationality
means two things. First, when they receive new information, agents update their beliefs correctly, in the
manner described by Bayes’s law. Second, given their beliefs, agents make choices that are normatively
acceptable, in the sense that they are consistent with Savage’s notion of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU).”
6 First-order risk aversion refers to a utility functional that can exhibit risk aversion for small prizes.
Under FAI, and assuming wealth is significant, a differentiable utility function does not exhibit first-order risk
aversion, though it can at non-differentiable points (Segal and Spivak [1990]). Under NAI it does. In context,
the reference in the text is to a “disappointment aversion” model.
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Appendix E: Data Access
All computer code, and data from the laboratory experiments, is available on request. It may
also be downloaded from http://cear.gsu.edu/gwh/. All estimations were undertaken with version
14 of Stata.
Access to Danish micro data (“the Registry”) follows the Act on Processing of Personal
Data (in Danish, the Lov om Behandling af Personoplysninger). This requires a notification to the Danish
Data Protection Agency whenever data are made available to researchers. Access can only be
granted to researchers in authorised environments. Authorizations can be granted to public research
and analysts environments (e.g., in universities, research institutes, and ministries) and to research
organizations as a part of a charitable organization. Certain groups in the private sector can also
obtain authorization. Only Danish institutions are granted authorization. Foreign researchers can
have access to Danish micro data if they are affiliated with an appropriate Danish institution.
Visiting researchers can have remote access from a workplace in the Danish research institution
during their stay in Denmark, and under the Danish authorization.
Generally data for a new Registry project is obtained by the following steps:
• an appropriate Danish institution grants permission for the research project;
• the Department of Data for Research at Statistics Denmark is contacted at
http://www.dst.dk/en/TilSalg/Forskningsservice;
• a Project description is delivered to Statistics Denmark for approval;
• data costs are calculated and a contract is signed; and
• data is extracted to the project.
The procedure is described in detail at: 
http://www.dst.dk/-/media/Kontorer/13-Forskning-og-Metode/Step-by-step-procedures-f
or-researchers-access-to-Microdata.pdf?la=en
We append this document at the end of this appendix.
The additional experimental data, which we have collected ourselves, is subsequently
obtained by being transferred from our project at Statistics Denmark to the new project.
In practice, another way to gain access is for researchers to contact a researcher at an
appropriate Danish institution that already has an approved project and is willing to provide access.
That researcher would then facilitate contact with Statistics Denmark, and access would only be
allowed if the new project was subsequently approved. So the only way that this path differs is that
the “first contact” is through an existing researcher, rather than Statistics Denmark. In the end, direct
approval from Statistics Denmark is always needed.
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Step-by- step practices for national register-based 
research projects at Statistics Denmark 
 
Below, you will find a brief – step-by-step overview for the practices and proce-
dures when applying for access to register data through statistics Denmark’s 
research services.  
 
The description is designed to outline the typical main steps seen from a re-
searcher’s point of view from the first initial contact with statistics Denmark 
until the researcher gets access to register data. 
 
 
Step 1: Contact: 
The first step is typically that you contact one of the staff members from the 
Research Unit at Statistics Denmark for an initial discussion and presentation 
of the project. The staff members can be contacted by phone +45 3917 3130 or 
by E-mail. E-mail addresses can be found on the internet.  
http://www.dst.dk/en/TilSalg/Forskningsservice.aspx 
 
 
Step 2: Authorization: 
In order to get access to micro data through Statistics Denmark, it is a pre-
requisite that you are affiliated by a research environment pre-approved by 
Statistics Denmark. In case you are already affiliated with an authorized insti-
tution you can move directly to step 2.    
 
In case your institution is not authorized, please contact the Research Service 
Unit for further information. In general, authorizations can be granted to pub-
lic research and analysis environments (e.g. universities, ministries, etc.), to 
research organizations as a part of a non-profit foundation and under certain 
circumstances companies within the private sector. Statistics Denmark will not 
grant authorization to single persons. 
 
In order get an authorization an application need to be submitted to the Re-
search Service Unit at Statistics Denmark. The application should include 1) a 
description of the research environment; 2) name and contact information for a 
responsible manager of the authorization (often the Head of the Department).  
Statistics Denmark will evaluate the application carefully and make a concrete 
assessment of the applicant’s reliability as a data recipient (e.g.: ownership, 
educational standard among the staff and the research experience). If the insti-
tution is approved for access to micro data an authorization contract between 
Statistics Denmark and the research institution/environment is signed by the 
National Chief Statistician – Mr Jørgen Elmeskov and the responsible research 
manager at the institution (For details. please see appendix A).  
 
The most important point in the authorization contracts is that the person sign-
ing the authorization agreement on behalf of the research/analysis environ-
ment undertakes personally to supervise that the confidentiality of data is al-
ways kept. The researcher may not, directly or indirectly, download the dataset 
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or any datasets derived there from. Furthermore, individual records may not be 
printed, and all output must be aggregated to an extent that eliminates any risk 
of direct or indirect identification of persons or enterprises. The researcher may 
not attempt to make such identification. 
 
Step 3 – Project description and approval 
The next step in the process is to submit a project proposal to Statistics Den-
mark (1-2 pages, a template can be found in appendix C). It is important to 
stress that access to data is given according to a so-called “need to know”-
principle, implying that you can only get access to the data needed to fulfil your 
research purpose.  
 
The proposal needs to cover the following paragraphs:  
 Description of purpose of the research project 
 Population to be studied (Need to know) 
 DST registers included in the study (Need to know) 
 External data (survey data or data from external registers) 
 Register year  
 Who will have access to data 
In order to assist you in selecting the registers of relevance for your project, you 
can find comprehensive descriptions of most of the registers provided by Statis-
tics Denmark in the quality declaration compiled for each statistic. The declara-
tions describe quality and content of data as well as information about purpose, 
history, collection method, accuracy, reference period, and comparability over 
time. All quality declarations can be found on the internet on the following 
page: http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/dokumentation/Declarations.aspx 
 
Most of the data derive from the administrative registers of governmental 
agencies, offering high data quality for the entire Danish populations of per-
sons, buildings and companies. Data can be combined in infinite ways, allowing 
you to produce unique analysis of dynamic processes and fluctuations, using 
the Danish population. Altogether, data from 250 subject-areas are available 
for research purposes through Statistics Denmark. The majority of the registers 
fall into the following headlines: 
 
 Population  Social conditions  Business enterprises 
 Education   Health   Housing 
 Labour market  Justice  Environment 
 Earnings  Income  External trade 
 
If there are external data – taken to mean data not produced by Statistics 
Denmark - such as survey data or data from other register owners, permission 
must be granted by the Danish Data Protection Agency. It is your responsibility 
that the permission is granted.  
 
 
Step 4 – Data extraction protocol 
Based on the project description the Research Service Unit will prepare a de-
tailed data extraction protocol, including detailed lists of variables as well as 
sets of values, if they are of relevance. Descriptions of all variables can be found 
in our documentation system TIMES, which is also published on the internet,  
so far in Danish only.  
 
The 600 mostly used variables have very detailed variable descriptions, includ-
ing data breaches as well as appendices with special interest. This documenta-
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tion is called High Quality Documentation and can be found on the following 
home page:  
http://www.dst.dk/da/TilSalg/Forskningsservice/Dokumentation/hoejkvalitet
svariable.aspx 
 
Documentation of other variables produced by Statistics Denmark can be found 
on the following pages: 
 
Current variables: 
http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/dokumentation/times.aspx 
 
Historical variables: 
http://www.dst.dk/extranet/staticsites/TIMES3/html/Start000-0000-0000-
0000-000000000000.htm 
 
 
Step 5 – Price calculation and contract is signed 
Based on the data extraction protocol a price will be calculated. At present, 
DKK 1,229.00 (EURO ~150) is charged per hour for extraction of data (January 
2013). 10 hours of free initial advisory services are given for new projects man-
aged by public research and analysis environment. Additional charge for disk 
storage in the case of large-scale projects and log-on charge for private compa-
nies will be charged. Finally, a contract stating price and expected time of de-
livery is sent to you. 
 
 
Step 6 – Data extraction and working with micro data on the servers 
Data extraction will be initiated shortly after Statistic Denmark has received a 
signed contract. Data are anonymized by means of a project-specific key before 
data are entered into the researcher computer (all identifying variables such as 
CPR numbers, addresses etc. are replaced by project specific random num-
bers). When research data for a project have been prepared by the Research 
Service Unit, the data are transferred to the research server where remote ac-
cess is given via the Internet. Communications via the Internet is protected and 
encrypted, which secures against unauthorized access. 
 
However, before getting access you have to sign an agreement with Statistics 
Denmark., cf. the agreement in Appendix B.  The agreement states that all work 
on micro data must take place on the research server and no attempts to identi-
fy people or enterprises – or to remove micro data must be made. It is consid-
ered a very serious breach of the agreement between the researcher and Statis-
tics Denmark if you transfer micro data from the research server to your own 
computer or make attempt to identify individual persons.  A breach of these 
rules may exclude you from using any research schemes of Statistics Denmark 
for a period of time or permanently. In worst cases, the authorization of your 
research institution might be withdrawn for a period of time. 
 
All aggregated results from the researchers´ computer can be stored in a spe-
cial file and such printouts are sent to the researchers by e-mail. This is a con-
tinuous process (every five minutes) and has shown to be quite effective. The 
advantage for Statistics Denmark is that all e-mails are logged at Statistics 
Denmark and checked by the Research Service Unit. Several computer packets 
are available on the research server, such as SAS, SPSS, STATA, GAUSS and R. 
The programs are frequently updated with new versions. 
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APPENDIX A: 
 
AUTHORISATION 
 
Statistics Denmark hereby grants 
 
Authorisation for 
 
Remote electronic access to selected datasets at Statistics Denmark 
 
Remote access via the Internet is subject to the following terms: 
 
1. A project description must be submitted, which states the project objec-
tives and renders it possible to select the data required for successful 
project execution.  
2. Based on the project and data description, Statistics Denmark decides 
whether external electronic access to data can be granted for the speci-
fied project.  
3. The researcher to whom external electronic access is granted shall sign 
a special agreement with Statistics Denmark, cf. appendix. 
4. All datasets are confidential, cf. subsection 3 of section 27 of the Danish 
Public Administration Act and section 152 of the Danish Criminal Code. 
5. The researcher obtains access to make batch runs on Statistics Den-
mark’s special researcher machines from the research/analysis envi-
ronment. Access can also via the research/analysis environment be 
switched to linked-up home computers in accordance with the guide-
lines determined by Statistics Denmark. 
6. Only the client software assigned by Statistics Denmark may be applied 
in connection with the RSA SecurID card provided. A PC connected to 
Statistics Denmark may not be made available to unauthorised persons, 
and when the user leaves the PC, the PC must be either shut down or 
disconnected, i.e. protected from any unauthorised use.  
7. The password of the individual researcher is personal and strictly con-
fidential. 
8. The researcher may not, directly or indirectly, download the dataset or 
any datasets derived there from. All transfers of output for printing or 
further statistical processing (in spreadsheets or similar) must be exe-
cuted in accordance with the guidelines and methods laid down by Sta-
tistics Denmark. Statistics Denmark will create a log file of such author-
ised transfers. Furthermore, individual records may not be printed, and 
all output must be aggregated to an extent that eliminates any risk of 
direct or indirect identification of persons or enterprises. The research-
er may not attempt to make such identification.  
9. Statistics Denmark shall be entitled at unannounced visits to check that 
the rules of this agreement are observed. 
10. The person signing this agreement on behalf of the research/analysis 
environment shall ensure that publications by the environment do not 
contain any information that may identify individual persons or indi-
vidual enterprises.  
11. The person signing this agreement on behalf of the research/analysis 
environment undertakes personally to supervise or to appoint a person 
to supervise that the provisions of this agreement are observed. 
12. In case of breach of the provisions of this agreement, the researcher in 
breach will be excluded from using any research schemes of Statistics 
Denmark permanently or for a period of not less than three years. Fur-
thermore, in the case of breach hereof, this authorisation will be with-
drawn for a period.  
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This agreement, which is signed in two copies, enters into force on (date) and 
may be terminated by either party at three months’ notice.  
 
Copenhagen, date  
 
 
________________________ 
Jørgen Elmeskov 
 
 
 
Copenhagen, date  
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APPENDIX B: 
Statistics Denmark 
 
AGREEMENT 
 
Between Statistics Denmark and Name of researcher has been concluded on 
establishing direct electronic access to selected datasets for research.  
 
Access is given in accordance with the authorisation granted to (Name of In-
stitution) by Statistics Denmark in connection with special agreement dated  
(Date)   
 
The agreement is subject to the following terms: 
 
1. The data sets to which access is given shall be treated as confidential in-
formation in accordance with Section 27, subsection 3 of the Danish 
Administration Act and Section 152 of the Danish Penal Code. 
2. Processing of the basic data may only be conducted from the research 
environment for which the authorisation been granted, or access can 
also via the authorized research/analysis environment be switched to 
linked-up home computers in accordance with the guidelines deter-
mined by Statistics Denmark. 
3. A computer linked up to Statistics Denmark may not be placed at the 
disposal of other persons, and the connection shall be completely 
turned off or disconnected, when the computer is not used, i.e. protect-
ed against unauthorized use. 
4. Passwords, which are supplied by Statistics Denmark for the project are 
strictly personal and shall not be passed on to any third party.  
5. Basic data as well as derived data sets shall not, neither directly nor in-
directly, be downloaded.  
6. All transfers of output (tables, analytical results), etc. for printing or for 
further statistical processing shall only take place in accordance with 
the guidelines and methods determined by Statistics Denmark. A log-
ging of these transfers is conducted by Statistics Denmark.  
7. Confidential data shall not be printed, including data at the level of in-
dividuals or firms, and all output shall be aggregated in such a manner 
that it is impossible to identify individual persons or individual firms 
directly or indirectly. Attempts at identifying individual persons or 
firms are not permissible. 
8. Access to the data is given for the period:  Two years with the pos-
sibility of extension. 
9. No information from the project in which it is possible to identify an 
individual person or individual firm may be published. 
10. Published information from the project shall be submitted to Statistics 
Denmark for scrutiny. 
11. If a “token”, has been provided for the project, it shall be returned to 
Statistics Denmark when the agreement expires.  
 
On attached researchers in particular.  
12. The responsible person signing the agreement of authorisation for the 
authorised Danish institution, shall approve and assume the responsi-
bility that all existing rules governing access to micro data are observed 
by the associated researcher. 
13. It shall be the responsibility of the authorised Danish institution to in-
form the attached researcher of the rules governing the use of micro da-
ta, including the rules of confidentiality in force as well as the rules 
governing downloading of data   
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14. The associated researcher’s access to micro data shall pass through the 
authorised Danish institution and can also be switched to linked-up 
home computers in accordance with the rules governing work from 
home   
15. The authorised Danish institution appoints a contact person undertak-
ing the responsibility for all contact with the attached researcher and 
Statistics Denmark.  
16. All invoices concerning the attached researcher are forwarded to and 
paid by the authorised Danish institution in question in accordance 
with the terms of invoicing applicable to the institution.  
 
A breach of the provisions of this agreement will imply that access to the data is 
immediately denied. Furthermore, the person who has signed this agreement 
will in future be excluded from using any of Statistics Denmark’s research 
schemes. In the case of minor breaches, the person will be excluded from Sta-
tistics Denmark’s research schemes temporarily for a period of not less than 
three years.  
 
This agreement may be terminated by either party at 3 months’ notice. If the 
authorisation of the research/analysis environment expires or is changed, this 
agreement is simultaneously cancelled.  
 
Signatures and date: 
 
 
 
Statistics Denmark 
 
 
 
 
Researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher’s manager, who has signed the agreement of authorisation  
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APPENDIX C: 
 
Project no. xxxxxx 
Recommendation of Project Approval 
Authorised institution 
Write the name of the institution 
Project title 
Write the project title 
Project description 
Write a short description of the project including the objectives of the pro-
ject. 
Population 
Define the population(s) 
Variables included 
List the registers and if possibly the variables you want to access 
 
Please also include information on external data or own survey data if such 
data is part of the project. In such cases please include approval from the 
Danish Protection Agency. 
Authorised scientists 
Name, Institution, E-mail and Cell phone number of the scientists, whom 
will be working with the data.  
 
 
Research Service, Date 
 
 
 
Approved for external access 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
Ivan Thaulow 
 
 
